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Abstract 
This thesis shows how an emissions trading scheme can help African countries contribute to the goal 
of stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This is done  through an 
assessment of  the gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation policy architecture and the potential 
benefits of emissions trading as a policy instrument—including lessons learned from emissions 
trading schemes implemented in the US, the EU, New Zealand, and Chile. The thesis concludes that 
adopting an emissions trading scheme as a policy instrument in Africa could potentially close the 
gaps in its policy architecture.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Climate Change and the UNFCCC 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis argues for the inclusion of emissions trading in Africa’s climate change 
mitigation policy architecture. Emission trading is a system of environmental regulation 
that allows polluters flexibility in complying with environmental goals.  A firm can 
comply either by reducing emissions from its own facility or by acquiring emission 
reductions from another facility, so long as the total allowable emissions is not exceeded. 
This kind of environmental regulation can help African countries meet their individual 
obligations to mitigate climate change. It can be a veritable source of carbon finance to 
African countries that can be used to achieve a low carbon growth. 
The global carbon market has been marginal in Africa’s fight against climate change. 
Africa’s share in the global carbon market is a meagre 2 percent.1 The carbon market is 
important in the fight against climate change, because by placing a market value on 
emission reduction activities, it will incentivize the need for development along a low 
emissions pathway. The countries most threatened by climate change are currently on the 
sidelines of an important revenue source for combating the challenges of climate change, 
even as carbon is steadily becoming the most traded commodity in the world.  The value 
of the global carbon market grew to 176 billion dollars in 2011 and the market is 
expected to grow more in the future.2 An emissions trading scheme can aid in Africa’s 
integration in the global carbon market through the linking of the proposed scheme to the 
                                                 
1
 World Bank Press Release No: 2012/417/ACF, online: 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23182183~pagePK:64257043~
piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html?cid=3001_2> Africa currently has 85 registered CDM projects 
representing just 2 percent of the 4000 projects registered by the CDM Executive Board. 
2
 World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012 (Washington, DC: Carbon Finance, World 
Bank May 2012) at 9. 
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global carbon market. Emissions trading can also help Africa reduce its emissions. 
Historically, Africa’s contribution to the global greenhouse pool has been small. 
The region was estimated to have contributed only 3.57 percent of the world’s total 
carbon dioxide emissions in 1988.3 However, there is an upward trend to Africa’s 
greenhouse gas emissions even as countries undergo development. Developing countries 
in Africa, particularly the least developed countries, are in a phase of massive 
infrastructure build-up, and failure to immediately leapfrog to low carbon technologies 
could lead to a lock-in in high-emissions systems for decades to come.4  
Emissions trading can also help Africa prepare for a carbon-constrained future. At some 
point in the international climate change negotiations, developing countries may be asked 
to assume more responsibility in the fight against climate change by assuming quantified 
emissions limitation obligations and reduction commitments. Emissions trading can help 
Africa prepare for such a time. Implementing an emissions trading scheme would make 
African countries cultivate the culture of sustainable development, or climate compatible 
growth. 
The legal questions to be addressed in this thesis are as follows: “What are the gaps in 
Africa’s climate change mitigation policy architecture?” and, “Would adopting emissions 
trading as a policy instrument close the gaps in Africa’s climate change policy 
architecture?” 
The former question will be answered by looking at the mitigation platforms for 
developing countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
                                                 
3
 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Action Plan of the Environment Initiative, at 62 online: 
<http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Environment%20Action%20Plan.pdf>. NEPAD is the socioeconomic 
development framework for Africa adopted by African leaders in July 2001. 
4
 AMCEN, Addressing Climate Change Challenges in Africa: A Practical Guide Towards Sustainable 
Development (AMCEN Secretariat 2011), at 91. AMCEN is the African Ministerial Council on the 
Environment. 
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Change (UNFCCC),5 their implementation to date in Africa and the proposed carbon tax 
in South Africa.  
Africa’s mitigation policy is not yet developed, as African countries have generally 
placed less emphasis on mitigation of climate change,6 with the exception of South 
Africa.  
The latter question will be answered by looking at the nature of emissions trading as a 
climate change mitigation policy instrument and the potential benefits of its adoption as a 
greenhouse gas mitigation policy in Africa. 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one will be introductory; it provides a 
background for the ideas to be discussed in this thesis. This chapter will address the 
concept of climate change and its scientific basis. An understanding of the scientific basis 
of climate change is important in knowing why climate change is a problem and why the 
world must act to tackle this problem. This will then be followed by a discussion of the 
legal framework governing climate change.  This chapter also highlights the research 
methodology to be adopted and the scholarly significance of this research work. Chapter 
Two will be an analysis of CDM and REDD+ implementation in Africa; it will also 
contain an analysis of the proposed carbon tax in South Africa and NAMA design. 
Chapter Three will deal with the evolution of emissions trading as a policy instrument 
and its theoretical framework. It will also present the potential benefits of the policy and 
its viability in the African context. Chapter Four will present possible downsides of 
implementing an emissions trading scheme in Africa. Chapter Five will discuss ETS 
success stories, along with lessons from ETS reviews. Chapter Six concludes the 
arguments in the thesis. 
                                                 
5
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, 31 ILM 849 
(entered into force 21 March 1994). 
6
 See AMCEN supra note 4 at 84. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
 
Climate Change is now a recognised problem; scholars have been pontificating on the 
kind of policy intervention that is needed to solve the challenge. The type of policy 
intervention recommended by scholars depends on whether the country is a developing 
country or a developed country. This is important for this study because Africa is a 
developing region. According to the World Bank, a developing country, “is one in which 
the majority lives on far less money—with far fewer basic public services—than the 
population in highly industrialized countries.”7 A developing country can be a middle-
income country. A middle-income country is a country that has made great strides 
entering the world economy and is creating better paying jobs, better and equitable 
education and health facilities and is investing in infrastructural development; but still 
faces substantial development challenges.8 There are currently 22 middle-income 
countries in Africa; they are Botswana, Cape Verde, South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Seychelles, Swaziland, Angola, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Zambia, Sudan, Cameroun, , Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritania, Sao 
Tome & Principe, Senegal. They have crossed the $1000 GDP per capita threshold.9 
Within the developing country category, there is a subcategory called the “least 
developed country” category. A least developed country is, “a low income country 
suffering from the most severe structural impediments to development.”10 
 After examining all the policy options available to national governments, Robert Stavins 
concluded that tradable permit schemes are more suited to the climate change challenge 
                                                 
7
 About Development, online: World Bank 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:20147486~menuPK:
344190~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:95474,00.html>. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 F. Wolfgang, “Africa`s MICs” (19 November 2012), online: World Bank Blog 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/africas-mics>. 
10
 LDC Information: Criteria for Identifying Least Developed Countries, online: United Nations 
Development Policy and Analysis Division 
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml>. 
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than any other policy instrument because of their cost effectiveness, since the cost of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is exceptionally great.  He also advocated for an 
international tradable permit scheme because of the global nature of climate change. 
Involving all countries in this scheme could lead to transfer of wealth for developing 
countries.11 Ackerman and Stewart argued along the same line, positing that emissions 
trading programs hold great promise as cost effective methods for achieving 
environmental goals and encouraging technological innovation.12 
David Dreisen, however, disagrees. According to him, the “cheap fix” metaphor best 
describes emissions trading, rather than the “free lunch” metaphor (a win-win 
proposition) ascribed to by its proponents. Also according to him, emissions trading may 
facilitate the avoidance of initially expensive investments in innovative technology.13 
Blackman and Harrington shifted the debate to whether market based instruments are 
suitable for developing countries; they concluded—using the experience of China and 
Poland—that permit trading is not appropriate for developing countries because of weak 
institutional capacity to enforce environmental regulation.14 However, any policy 
instrument, be it environmental taxes or command and control, would need strong 
enforcement before it can succeed. They argue that technology standards may be 
appropriate for developing countries.15 One limitation of the use of technology standards 
                                                 
11
 Robert N. Stavins, “Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a 
Global Problem?” (1997) U. CHI. Legal F. 293 at 309.  
12
 Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case For Market 
Incentives” (1987-1988) 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L 171. 
13
 David Dreisen,  “Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? : The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change 
Convention” (1998-1999) 26 B.C Envtl. Aff. L. Rev 1. 
14
 Blackman and Harrington, Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution (Resources For the Future May 1999) 1 at 2, online: 
<http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-99-39.pdf>. 
15
 Ibid. 
6 
 
alone is its prohibitive cost. They also argue that the United States’ successful 
experimentation with emission trading cannot be replicated in a developing country.16 
Still on the point, Bell and Russell posit that technology standards may be more 
appropriate for building the initial capacity for emissions reduction because economic 
incentive programmes require more specific and greater institutional capacity, have more 
stringent monitoring requirements, and may require fully developed market economies to 
be effective.17 
Willems and Baumert support this approach, but also note that technology approaches, 
policies and measures may have greater applicability to the general capacity needs of 
developing countries interested in pursuing sustainable development strategies.18 
Russell and Vaughan suggest that a transitional strategy is the appropriate approach for 
developing countries, whereby technology standards are introduced first, followed by 
performance standards, and finally experimentation with market-based instruments.19 
Ellerman contends that a performance standard at the facility level and an overall 
emissions cap could provide a more effective structure.20 This type of approach, he 
argues, could facilitate a transition to a tradable permits programme as the institutions 
and economies develop over time.21 
                                                 
16
 Ibid at 28. 
17
 Ruth Greenspan Bell and Clifford Russell, “ Environmental Policy for Developing Countries” (Issues in 
Science and Technology Spring 2002), online: <http://www.issues.org/18.3/greenspan.html>. 
18
 Stephane Willems and Kelvin Baumert, Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions, (OECD 
Environment Directorate 2003), online: <http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/21018790.pdf>. 
19
 Clifford Russell and William Vaughan, “The Choice of Pollution Control Policy Instruments in 
Developing Countries: Arguments, Evidence and Suggestions”, (2003) International Yearbook of 
Environment and Resource Economics 331-370, online: 
<http://www.colby.edu/economics/faculty/thtieten/ec476/Russell.pdf>. 
20
 Denny Ellerman, “Designing a Tradable Permit System in China: Principles and Practice”, (2002) 23 
Energy Journal, online: <http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publications/reprints/Reprint_161_WC.pdf>. 
21
 Ibid. 
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Chile has successfully used emissions trading to control particulates matter22 emissions in 
the city of Santiago. The Chilean experiment with tradable permit scheme shows that 
there is no reason to believe that emissions trading cannot succeed in a developing 
country. Though it is not without its challenges, the program is a strong validation that 
emissions trading can work in a terrain where the monitoring is not perfect. According to 
Coria and Sterner, 
The Chilean scheme compares quite favourably with all the early U.S. 
programs and to the European ETS scheme, which, (despite being launched 
long after the Chilean scheme) has roughly the same number of flaws 
related to over-allocation and lack of clear rules for penalties.23 
Despite the fact Chile has used a tradable permit scheme to control industrial pollution, 
the question as to what policy instrument is appropriate for developing country remains 
open because the Chilean example is not enough to conclude that emissions trading 
scheme is suitable for all developing countries. The question would only be settled as 
more developing countries develop their climate change mitigation framework. No 
African country has yet deployed emissions trading as a domestic policy instrument, as at 
the time of writing. However, countries like Nigeria and South Africa have used, and are 
still using, environmental tax to mitigate climate change. These two countries’ experience 
with environmental tax will be analysed in this work. It will be argued that, in view of the 
greenhouse intensity of the two largest economies in Africa, a tradable permit scheme 
will best serve their environmental and health needs. 
1.3 Climate Change and the UNFCCC 
What is Climate Change? 
There are different definitions of climate change. According to the UNFCCC, 
                                                 
22   Particulate matter is the term used for solid or liquid particles found in the air. It is a class of aerosols. 
Particulate matter is formed when gaseous pollutants such as S02 and N0x react to form fine particles. See 
Particulate Matter (PM-10), online: <http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/aqtrnd95/pm10.html>. 
23
 Jessica Coria and Sterner, Tradable Permits in Developing Countries Evidence From Air Pollution in 
Santiago, Chile, (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper December 2008), 1 at 27, online: 
<http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-08-51.pdf>. 
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Climate change means a change of climate, which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed 
over comparable time periods.24 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate 
Change is: 
A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using 
statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties 
and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate 
change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings, or to 
persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in 
land use.25 
A common idea running through all the definitions of climate change is that it is an 
increase in the average temperature of the atmosphere at a rate far from normal, caused 
by the anthropogenic emission of gases that trap the sun's heat in the atmposhere.26  
While weather is closely intertwined with the climate, climate change does not exactly 
equate to weather change.′ It is statistical changes in weather over time that equates to 
climate change.27 There are important differences between weather and the climate. The 
chaotic nature of weather makes it unpredictable beyond a few days, but projecting 
changes in climate (long term average weather) is much more manageable.28 
Long-term variations brought about by changes in the composition of the atmosphere are 
much more predictable than individual weather events. Climate change can be classified 
as either natural or anthropogenic; climate change is said to be anthropogenic when the 
change in climate is human-induced or emanates from human activities.  
                                                 
24
 supra note 5, Article 1. 
25
 Field C.B et al., eds, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation Glossary of Terms (Cambridge University Press 2012) at 557. 
26
 See Crispin Tickell, Climatic Change and World Affairs, 2nd ed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1986). 
 
27
 Letreut et al., “Historical Overview of Climate Change Science” in Solomon et al, eds, Climate Change 
2007,the Physical Science Basis (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 94 at 104. 
28
 Ibid. The major reason why weather is not predictable beyond a few days is the property of the ever-
changing atmosphere. The climate also differs from weather in that it covers or impacts the whole earth 
system, including the atmosphere, land surface, oceans, snow, ice, other bodies of water and living things. 
9 
 
While many factors influence the climate, scientists have determined that human 
activities have become a dominant force, and are responsible for most of the warming 
observed over the past 50 years.29  
According to Crispin Tickell, 
Climate change is accelerating because the human foot is on the 
accelerator. A periodical visitor from outer space would find more change 
in the surface of the earth in the last 20 years than he would have found in 
the last 200, and in the last 200 more than in the last 2000. Since the 
industrial revolution, we have been using the sky as a waste unit. As a 
result, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has now reached its highest level 
in 400 000 years, and is at a third higher than in pre-industrial times.30 
Human-caused climate change has resulted not only from changes in the number of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, but also changes in small particles 
(aerosols) and changes in land use.31 
Scientists have explained that greenhouse gases trap the sun’s heat by acting like 
blankets, which absorb heat radiation that should escape to space, thereby heating the 
atmosphere at a rate far higher than normal. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to 
global warming include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and halocarbons.  
According to scientific studies, the primary effect of these gases in the atmosphere is that 
they change the equilibrium between incoming radiation from the sun and outgoing 
radiation from the earth. By blocking some of the infrared radiation from the earth and 
radiating it back to the earth's surface, the gases warm the lower atmosphere and cool the 
upper atmosphere. In turn, this increases moisture, which traps more infrared radiation. 
The effect of rising temperatures is to reduce the areas covered by snow and ice, thereby 
                                                 
29
 Climate Change 2007 the Physical Science Basis supra note 10 at 105. 
30
 Crispin Tickell, “The Impact of Climate Change on the Economy”, a speech delivered to the Woodhouse 
Group, University of Leeds, 10 February 2004, online: <http://www.crispintickell.com/page79.html>. 
31
 supra note 10 at 105. 
10 
 
diminishing the amount of heat reflected back into space and increasing absorption of 
solar radiation.32  
These greenhouse gases released by human activities intensify the natural greenhouse 
effect. The natural greenhouse effect works this way: 
The sun powers Earth’s climate, radiating energy at very short 
wavelengths, predominately in the visible or near-visible (e.g., ultraviolet) 
part of the spectrum. Roughly one-third of the solar energy that reaches the 
top of Earth’s atmosphere is reflected directly back to space. The 
remaining two-thirds is absorbed by the surface and, to a lesser extent, by 
the atmosphere. To balance the absorbed incoming energy, the Earth must, 
on average, radiate the same amount of energy back to space. Because the 
Earth is much colder than the Sun, it radiates at much longer wavelengths, 
primarily in the infrared part of the spectrum. Much of this thermal 
radiation emitted by the land and ocean is absorbed by the atmosphere, 
including clouds, and radiated back to Earth. This is called the greenhouse 
effect… 
Without the natural greenhouse effect, the average temperature of Earth’s 
surface would be below the freezing point of water. Thus Earth’s natural 
greenhouse effect makes life as we know it possible.33 
Scientific studies show that carbon dioxide (CO2) is produced by the burning of fossil 
fuels (coal, oil and gas) as well as by land-use activities such as deforestation; methane is 
produced by cattle, rice agriculture, fossil fuel use and landfills; and nitrous oxide is 
produced by the chemical industry, cattle feed lots, and agricultural soils.34 
Since 1750, the time of the Industrial Revolution, CO2 has increased by 31 percent, 
methane by 151 percent and nitrous oxide by 17 percent.35 Developed countries have 
                                                 
32
 See Crispin Tickell, “The Causes of Climate Change”, supra  note 9 at 79. See also Article 1 of the 
UNFCCC supra note 5. 
33
 Climate Change 2007, the Physical Science Basis supra note 10 at 115. 
34
 P. Forster et al., “ Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and Radioactive Forcing” in Solomon et al, eds, 
Climate Change 2007, the Physical Science Basis (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 129 
at 135. 
35
 James E. Hansen, “Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb” (2004) 3 Sci. Amer. 68-77. 
11 
 
been identified as the major causative agents of climate change and global warming.36 
Studies show that industrialized countries produce more CO2 per head of population (per 
capita emissions) than developing countries.37 
Like greenhouse gases, aerosols also influence the climate.38 The two major types of 
aerosols are black carbon and sulphates.39 Sulphates come primarily from the burning of 
coal and oil, while black carbon comes from biomass burning, cooking with solid fuels, 
and diesel exhaust. China and India are the most significant contributors to black carbon 
in the atmosphere, contributing 35 and 25 percent of black carbon in the atmosphere, 
respectively.40 Countries in Europe and elsewhere that rely heavily on diesel fuel for 
transportation also contribute large amounts of black carbon. 
The difference between black carbon particles and greenhouse gases is that black carbon 
particles remain airborne for weeks while greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for 
years and sometimes even a century, depending on the type of greenhouse gas.41 
Climate change impacts could be cataclysmic if left unaddressed. According to James 
Hansen, a renowned United States scientist: 
The Earth’s climate is nearing, but has not passed a tipping point beyond 
which it will be impossible to avoid climate change, with far ranging, 
undesirable consequences. These include not only the loss of the Arctic as 
we know it, with all that implies for wildlife and indigenous peoples, but 
losses on a much vaster scale due to rising seas. Ocean levels will increase 
                                                 
36
 Williams Chandler et al., “Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries”(Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change October 2002)  at 1online: < http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/dev_mitigation.pdf> 
See also Crispin Tickell, “Climate change: Warming, Cooling, Dimming and the Consequences” an address 
delivered to the Manchester Luncheon Club, Freemasons' Hall, Manchester, on 7 April 2005, online: 
<http://www.crispintickell.com/page79.html>. 
37
 Each Country`s Share of C02 Emissions, online: Union of Concerned Scientists 
<http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html>. 
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 Aerosols May Drive a Significant Portion of Artic Warming, online: NASA 
<http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/warming_aerosols.html>. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ramanathan and Carmachiael, “Global and Regional Climate Changes due to Black Carbon” (2008) 1 
Nature GeoScience 221 at 222. 
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slowly at first, as losses at the fringes of Greenland and Antarctica due to 
accelerating ice streams are nearly balanced by increased snowfall and ice 
sheet thickening in the ice sheet interiors. But as Greenland and West 
Antarctic ice is softened and lubricated by melt water, and as buttressing 
ice shelves disappear because of a warming ocean, the balance will tip 
toward the rapid disintegration of ice sheets… 
This grim scenario can be halted if the growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions is slowed in the first quarter of this century.42 
 
A respected UK scientist, Professor David King also reinforced the calamitous nature of 
climate change when he said: 
Antarctica is likely going to be the world’s only habitable continent by the 
end of this century, if global warming remains unchecked… the earth is 
now entering the first hot period since 60 million years ago when there 
may be no ice on the planet and when the rest of the globe may not sustain 
human life.43 
According to the IPCC, the world is already experiencing the effects of rising 
temperatures and extreme weather.44  
                                                 
42
 James E. Hansen, “The Tipping Point?” during a presentation to the American Geophysical Union (6 
December 2005), online: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/jan/12/the-tipping-
point/?pagination=false>. 
43
 Geoffrey Lean, “Global Warming could soon make Antarctica the only place to live, says Chief British 
Scientist” The Independent on Sunday (2 May 2004). 
44
 “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in 
global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average 
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over the globe and is greater at higher northern latitudes (Figure 1.2). Average Arctic temperatures have 
increased at almost twice the global average rate in the past 100 years. Land regions have warmed faster 
than the oceans(Figures 1.2 and 2.5). Observations since 1961 show that the average temperature of the 
global ocean has increased to depths of at least 3000m and that the ocean has been taking up over 80% of 
the heat being added to the climate system. New analyses of balloon- borne and satellite measurements of 
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temperature. Increases in sea level are consistent with warming (Figure 1.1).Global average sea level rose 
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[2.4to 3.8]mm per year from 1993 to 2003.” Pachauri R.K and Reseinger A, eds, Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report (IPCC Geneva Switzerland) 26 at 30. 
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Kovats and Haines confirmed that the world is already feeling the effects of climate 
change: 
Global climate change caused by the relentless build-up of greenhouse 
gases in the earth’s atmosphere is already disrupting ecosystems and is 
already causing about 150,000 additional deaths per year. An average 
global warming of 2 0C threatens millions of people with an increased risk 
of hunger, malaria, flooding and water shortages.45 
 
According to the IPCC, even though climate change effects will be felt globally, the 
impacts will be hardest on poor and developing countries, especially those in Africa.46  
The vulnerability of a region to climate change impacts depends to a great 
extent on its wealth, and as such, poverty limits adaptive capabilities. 
Socio-economic systems typically are more vulnerable in developing 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
According to scientists from the United Kingdom Metrological Office, global warming has been on pause 
for 15 years.  Global average temperatures remain higher than they've ever been since modern records were 
kept but after a period of rapid increase in the 1980's and 90's, there's been a dramatic delay. The reason for 
the pause is that the oceans absorbed greater amounts of heat, which prevented people from noticing the 
difference at surface level. The Earth has been absorbing energy at a rate of 0.6 Watts per square metre - 
that's equivalent to 300 billion 1KW clothing irons being spread around the world.   But during the 
slowdown, that number fell to 0.48 Watts per square metre. Other factors that could have helped ease the 
rise include an increase in volcanic eruptions around the world and a slowdown in solar activity.  Despite 
the findings, they stressed that 12 of the 14 hottest years on record have been recorded since 2000. Between 
1998 and 2012, the average rate of warming was just 0.04 degrees Celsius per decade, compared with 
0.17C per decade from 1970-1998. They project a rise of 2 C above pre-industrial temperatures is expected 
in the next 50 years, the current slow down will delay that rise by five to ten years. Kevan Karaja, Scientists 
believe natural causes briefly paused climate change, online: Weather Network 
<http://www.theweathernetwork.com/news/articles/scientists-believe-natural-causes-briefly-paused-
climate-change/9866/>. 
45
 See: R. Kovats & A. Haines, “Global Climate Change and Health: Recent Findings and Future Steps” 
(2005) 172 CMAJ at 4. “Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate variability and change 
because of multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity. The extreme poverty of many Africans, frequent 
natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and agriculture, which is heavily dependent on rainfall, all 
contribute. Cases of remarkable resilience in the face of multiple stressors have, however, been shown 
(high confidence). Africa possesses many examples of coping and adaptation strategies that are used to 
manage a range of stresses including climate extremes (e.g., droughts and floods). Under possible increases 
in such stresses, however, these strategies are likely to be insufficient to adapt to climate variability and 
change, given the problems of endemic poverty, poor institutional arrangements, poor access to data and 
information, and growing health burdens” 
46
 Parry, Canziani, Pautikof, “Technical Summary” in Climate Change 2007 Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press 2007), 23 at 48-49. Adaptation is the act of 
building resilience in the ecosystems to cope with the unavoidable impacts of climate change, while 
mitigation involves cutting down of human activities that release greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. 
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countries where economic and institutional circumstances are less 
favorable; therefore developing countries, which have lesser capacity to 
adapt, are more vulnerable to   climate change damages, just as they are to 
other stresses. This condition will be most extreme among the poorest 
people.47 
                     
International response to climate change dates back to 1979 when the first World Climate 
Conference was held and highlighted concerns about the increasing concentration of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.                                                                                                                                                                                
In 1988, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, proposed by Malta, in favour of 
the protection of the climate for present and future generations.48 
The evidence of climate change emerging from the scientific community led the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) to establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. 
The mandate of the IPCC was to provide the world with clear scientific view on the 
current state of knowledge on climate change and its environmental and socio-economic 
impacts.49 The IPCC began issuing comprehensive assessment reports in 1990.  
The United Nations General Assembly also established an International Negotiating 
Committee in 1990; its task was to negotiate a framework convention. The first 
assessment report by the IPCC and the negotiated Framework Convention were 
deliberated upon at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. The negotiated 
Framework Convention known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change opened for signature at the Earth Summit in 1992. 
                                                 
47
 Q.K. Ahmad et al., “Summary for Policy Makers” in Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press), 1 at 8. 
48
 See: United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/43/53, online: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm>. 
49
 The IPCC only reviews and assesses the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic 
information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change. It does not conduct any 
research nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters. See: IPCC, online: 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UQIxpW9QSjQ>. 
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The UNFCCC entered into force in March 1994 and as of today, 195 countries have 
ratified the Convention.50 The Convention has as its objective: “the stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.51 
The Convention seeks to achieve this objective through three major principles: the 
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, the Precautionary Principle and 
the Cost Effectiveness Principle. 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility Principle 
 Article 3(1) of the Convention provides as follows: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
The Convention places the responsibility of protecting the climate system on all the 
parties but expects the developed countries to take the lead in the fight for two reasons: 
countries have limited resources to address the enormity of the risk that climate change 
poses. Developed countries, however, are more technologically advanced and have more 
financial resources available to them; so developed countries are better equipped to 
address the problem than developing countries. They are more technologically advanced 
and have more financial resources available to them. Since developed countries are in a 
more advantaged position to address the problem, they are able to assist developing 
countries with technology and finances to combat climate change. 
The second reason is that developed countries have been the major cause of the rising 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, particularly during the time of the 
Industrial Revolution. On the other hand, developing countries have contributed little to 
                                                 
50
 See: UNFCCC, online: <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php>. 
51
 art 2 supra note 5. 
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the climate change problem, so it would amount to a disproportionate burden if the 
responsibilities were even. 
Through this Principle, the Convention was intended to devise a fair solution to the 
matter. Since the participation of developing countries is needed in the fight, these 
countries would only come on board if it represented their interests. Developing countries 
are still battling with the mundane issues of food security and water supply. In fact, it was 
when the issue of climate change was framed in the context of the daily needs of food 
and water that developing countries got on board. The climate change problem was 
framed at first “as an abstract, global, technological dilemma that could be solved using 
market-based mechanisms and appropriate technologies; this alienated many developing 
countries in the climate change discussion”.52 Developing countries believe that 
developed countries owe an ecological debt because of their historic emissions. There can 
only be a level playing field if this responsibility is first acknowledged before anything 
else.53 
It is said that the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the 
Convention was patterned after the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Chemicals, 
after seeing the success of the Protocol.54  
At the time the international community agreed to phase out several chemicals under the 
Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Chemicals, the industrialized world used large 
amounts of these substances as refrigerants and industrial solvents. Developing countries 
were not prepared to give up domestic industries that use solvents or the future benefit of 
refrigeration—advantages long enjoyed by developed countries; so the developed 
countries agreed to lead the effort to solve the environmental problem they had caused by 
                                                 
52
 Harro Van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, “Stretching Too Far: Developing Countries and the Role of 
Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto” (2009) 28 Stan Envtl. L.J 311 at 318. 
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 See also Karin Mickelson “ Leading Towards a Level Playing Field, Repaying Ecological Debt, or 
Making Environmental Space: Three Stories About International Environmental Cooperation” 43 Osgoode 
Hall Journal 138-168. 
54
 David Dreisen, “Free Lunch or Cheap Fix? The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change 
Convention” supra note 9 at 11. 
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phasing out several ozone-depleting substances during the Montreal Protocol’s first 
decade.  
They also agreed to a program of developing and transferring new technology to make it 
possible for less developed countries to enjoy refrigeration and increased manufacturing 
capability without relying on ozone-depleting chemicals. The Montreal Protocol 
authorized some initial increases in developing countries' use of ozone-depleting 
chemicals but required these countries to reduce consumption of such chemicals; a 
decade after the developed countries phased them out. Developing countries agreed to a 
late phase-out because they believed that developed countries would manufacture 
adequate substitutes as they eliminated their own consumption of ozone-depleting 
chemicals.  
Accordingly, developing countries could help solve the environmental problem without 
foregoing benefits formerly associated with use of ozone-depleting chemicals. The 
developed countries did, in fact, develop adequate substitutes for many of these ozone-
depleting chemicals.55 
The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility is operationalized in the form 
of different legal obligations under the Convention. For example, Article 12 of the 
Convention allows for different reporting obligations. Parties report their obligations 
through what is called national communications. Developed Countries, known as Annex 
1 Parties under the Convention, are to issue their national communications to the Climate 
Change Secretariat biennially. They are also expected to update their national inventory 
of greenhouse gases regularly.56 
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 Barrat-Brown, “Building a Monitoring Regime under the Montreal Protocol” (1991) 16 Yale J. Int'l L. at 
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Apart from publishing a national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals, and impacts of proposed mitigation measures, developed countries must 
indicate in their national communication their proposed efforts to assist developing 
countries, as well as their contribution towards data collection and systemic observation 
of the climate in such countries. 
Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle is contained in Article 3(3) of the Convention. The 
Convention expects parties to take cautionary measures to anticipate and mitigate the 
adverse effects of climate change. When there is a doubt as to the effect of a proposed 
action on the climate system, parties should refrain from taking the step. Lack of 
scientific evidence establishing the detrimental nature of the proposed action is not a 
tenable excuse under the Convention. 
Dreisen argues that the Precautionary Principle provision is rooted in the science of 
climate change: scientists fear that climate change may occur quickly and unpredictably, 
hence, waiting for scientific certainty before taking action may involve suffering through 
decades or centuries of hurricanes, droughts, ecological destruction, etc.57 
The value of this principle in the Convention is that it takes into cognizance possible 
changes in scientific knowledge. It also reflects the reality that decision makers never 
have all the information they would like to have before making a decision that is likely to 
affect the environment.58 The provision also emphasises the role of environmental impact 
assessment in climate change mitigation. 
 
 
                                                 
57
 Dreisen supra note 9 at 16. 
58
 UNEP, Training Manual on International Environmental Law: Principles and Concepts of International 
Environmental Law, 23 at 32 online: <http://www.iucnael.org/en/online-resources/unep-training-
manual.html>. 
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Cost Effectiveness Principle 
The cost effectiveness principle is also contained in Article 3(3) of the Convention. It 
states that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost effective so 
as to ensure global benefits. Policies and measures that are expensive are generally not 
attractive to decision makers, especially in a world of scarce resources. What is more, 
expensive measures are generally prohibitive and will preclude the poor countries that are 
signatories to the Convention from enjoying the benefits of such measures. 
In Article 7, The Convention named the Conference of Parties as the supreme organ of 
the Convention. The Conference of Parties (COP) is to see to the implementation of the 
objectives of the Convention. In line with Article 7, the Conference of Parties has been 
meeting and deliberating on how best to achieve the objectives of the Convention. 
At the first Conference of the Parties in Berlin in April 1995, a proposal was made for an 
ancillary instrument to the Convention containing specific and legally binding targets.59  
This proposal led to a subsequent protocol known as the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The 
Protocol came into effect on 16 February 2005 with the receipt of the Russian 
Federation’s instrument of ratification by the United Nations on 18 November 2004. 
Following the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility entrenched in the 
Convention, the Kyoto Protocol introduced a legally binding set of obligations for 38 
industrialized countries and 11 countries in Central and Eastern Europe mandating them 
to return their GHG emissions to an average of approximately 5.2 percent below their 
1990 levels over the commitment period of 2008-2012. 
However, the Protocol allows for some amount of flexibility in the meeting of these 
obligations. It introduced three flexible (market) mechanisms by which the industrialized 
countries can meet their obligations. The three flexible mechanisms created under the 
Protocol were to supplement home grown mitigation efforts by Annex 1 countries.  The 
three market instruments are in line with the Cost Effectiveness Principle contained in the 
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Convention. The idea of the flexibility mechanisms is that Annex 1 countries can meet 
their obligations in a cost effective way. These market instruments are: International 
Emissions Trading provided for under Article 6, the Clean Development Mechanism 
provided for under Article 12 and the Joint Implementation under Article 4.60 These three 
mechanisms enable countries to pay for emission reductions anywhere on the planet, 
based on the idea that climate change is a global problem, and that its reductions are 
equally good for the climate no matter where they occur.61 
The Clean Development Mechanism allows the developed countries (Annex 1 countries) 
to invest in emissions reduction projects in developing countries, which they can use to 
meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Under the mechanism, developing 
countries are to learn sustainable development from their developed counterparts while 
the developing countries can use the emission reductions units garnered from the CDM 
projects to meet their obligations under the Protocol. 
Joint Implementation gives the latitude to two or more developed countries to collaborate 
in meeting their emissions limitation obligation under the Protocol. In determining 
whether the countries involved in such an agreement have met their obligations under the 
Protocol, recourse will only be had to the their total aggregate emissions so long it does 
not exceed their individual allowable emissions under the Protocol. 
Annex 1 countries are given Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) that limit the tonnes of 
greenhouse gases they are allowed to emit. Under the International Emissions Trading 
scheme of the Protocol, a particular Annex 1 country can purchase Emission Reduction 
Units (ERUs) from another developed country. The idea of this policy is to prevent a 
particular Annex1 country from exceeding its Assigned Amount Units under the 
Protocol. 
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The detailed rules for operation of the three market mechanisms were not contained in the 
Protocol. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 
7 in Marrakesh, Morocco in 2001, and are referred to as the “Marrakesh Accords”. The 
UN Climate Change Secretariat based in Bonn, Germany keeps an international 
transaction log to ensure that transactions are in accordance with the Protocol. 
The Convention expects parties to remove greenhouse gases by source and by sink.62 
Forests are believed to be sinks of greenhouse gases in that they capture carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere and consume it through the process of photosynthesis. In December 
2007, at the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Bali, Indonesia, 
signatories to the Convention decided that national and international efforts to mitigate 
climate change should include the enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing 
countries.63 This led to the creation of a mitigation platform known as REDD+ (Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). Parties 
in Bali noted that deforestation and forest degradation are both major sources of 
emissions and that, in some cases, forest degradation (e.g. of peat land soils) can generate 
high emission rates.64 REDD+ is particularly important for Africa because Africa has a 
lot of forest carbon potential and its forest reserves have been undergoing degradation. 
REDD+ is one of the mitigation areas of work identified by the African Union in the 
Conceptual Framework of African Climate Change Programmes.65 
The goal of stabilizing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is a 
long-term vision, thereby requiring the broad participation of all parties. At COP 16,66 
signatories observed that the pace of mitigation efforts has been slow. 
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Parties noted that:  
…deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to 
science, and as documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with a view to reducing 
global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global 
average temperature below 2 °C above preindustrial levels, and that 
Parties should take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent 
with science and on the basis of equity; also recognizes the need to 
consider, in the context of the first review, as referred to in paragraph 138 
below, strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best 
available scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global average 
temperature rise of 1.5 °C.67 
Parties stressed the need for enhanced action on mitigation by both developed country 
and developing country parties. Developing country parties were encouraged to formulate 
nationally appropriate mitigation plans of action in the context of sustainable 
development supported by technology, finance and capacity building. This gave rise to 
what is known as NAMA.68 The Cancun Agreements created a registry for nationally 
appropriate mitigation plans of action for developing countries. Eighteen African 
countries have submitted mitigation projects that require financial and technological 
assistance; they are Benin, Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, Tunisia, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Gabon, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone and Togo.69 
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Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ended in 2012.70 In Doha, Qatar, on 8 
December 2012 the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. The 
amendment would only come into force if it were accepted by three fourths of the parties 
to the Protocol.71 The amendment was negotiated at a price; the European Union agreed 
to a second commitment period for the Protocol on the condition that there will be 
another treaty that will be all inclusive of all the contributing countries to the global 
greenhouse gas pool, or an agreed outcome with legal force for the post-2020 period65.72 
An all-inclusive treaty that covers all the contributing sources to the global greenhouse 
gas pool has implications for a country like South Africa. Despite being a developing 
country, it is one of the top emitters of greenhouse gases. South Africa has been under 
increased international pressure along with China, Brazil and India to assume some form 
of binding targets; this means its mitigation efforts have to be scaled up. An all-inclusive 
treaty also has implications for the other 52 countries in the African continent. A timeline 
in which the emissions of developing countries would peak could be specified in an all-
inclusive treaty, meaning that African countries should be prepared for a carbon-
constrained future.  
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The new treaty could specify a time when developing countries will assume quantified 
limitation and reduction commitments. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Given the legal and practical nature of the research topic, the methodology to be adopted 
in this thesis will be analytical and expository.  The thesis will utilize orthodox legal 
methods of research, including the doctrinal, analytical and the case study approaches in 
providing answers to the research questions. 
First, I will expose the possible gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation policy 
architecture. I will look at the structure of the aforementioned policies with a view to 
pointing out their limitations. There will a doctrinal analysis of the literature on the nature 
and possible benefits of emissions trading. This will be followed by a case study 
approach on how to design a successful emissions trading scheme. This approach will 
show how emissions trading can cover the gaps in the policy architecture. 
1.5 Justification of Choice of ETS Case Studies 
In this thesis, there are four ETS schemes to be outlined as models for the proposed 
scheme. The schemes to be examined include: the U.S. Acid Rain Program, the EU ETS, 
the New Zealand ETS and the Santiago Particulate Program. The idea behind studying 
the four ETS schemes is to see what can be transferred or borrowed from these three ETS 
schemes to enhance the proposed scheme. 
The United States of America was the first to experiment with emissions trading as a 
means of pollution control. After some initial misses, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency finally succeeded with the Acid Rain Program. The Acid Rain 
Program was used to reduce the overall atmospheric levels of sulphur 
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dioxide and nitrogen oxides, which cause acid rain.73 The program was the most 
successful and largest cap and trade program until the EU ETS came into existence.74 
The cap and trade part of the program is significant for the proposed scheme because one 
of the problems that bedevilled CDM implementation in general is the problem of 
“additionality”.75 Baseline trading systems (the form of trading under the CDM) involve 
making a determination as to whether emissions reductions would have occurred anyway 
without the project. If the emissions reductions are not additional, it dilutes the 
environmental integrity of the scheme.76 
Obtaining data for baseline development is difficult, coupled with the fact that it is 
impossible to verify baseline data with the necessary degree of certainty.77 This is 
exacerbated in a continent where data management is still at its infancy.  
The EU ETS is the first multinational cap and trade program for greenhouse gases. It is a 
scheme involving sovereign nations with diverse historical, institutional, and economic 
circumstances. It is the largest cap and trade program in operation. Thus, it is a useful 
model from which to learn. Though the EU ETS was primarily designed to help 
European nations meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol,78 it also holds 
important lessons on how to manage a scheme involving countries without QELRCs 
under the Kyoto Protocol. This will be shown in the course of this work. 
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The New Zealand ETS is the first cap and trade program that covers all the Kyoto 
gases.79 New Zealand is a small country with modest emissions;80 it has a lot of carbon 
potential in the agriculture and forestry industries. Forestry is currently covered in the 
trading program, with plans to include the agricultural sector in 2015. Africa also has 
significant carbon potential in the agriculture and forestry industries. 
Chile is a developing country. Its experience with tradable permit scheme is apt for the 
countries in Africa. 
1.6 Scholarly Significance 
African countries like all other developing countries are inexperienced in greenhouse gas 
mitigation. It is important African countries build capacity in carbon trading since the 
global carbon market is at the heart of the world’s fight against climate change.  
The Stern Review have advocated for creation of a global price on carbon through the 
linking of emissions trading schemes as a way of fighting climate change in a cost 
effective manner.81 Thus, there is a strong probability that emissions trading will 
continue to play a major role in the fight against climate change. 
This work will also aid in the development of Africa’s climate policy. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Analysis of Africa’s Climate Change Mitigation Policy 
Architecture 
2.1 Introduction 
The strength of any policy architecture can only be measured against its overriding 
objectives. The African Union does not yet have a specific climate change mitigation 
objective.82 However, we have seen in the preceding chapter that the Conference of 
Parties (COP) has set a stabilization target of keeping the total global average warming to 
no more than 2ºC/3.5ºF relative to pre-industrial levels.83 This is the standard that will be 
used to analyse Africa’s climate change policy architecture.  
According to the Stern review,84 even if the developed world takes on responsibilities for 
absolute cuts in emissions of 60-80 percent by 2050, developing countries must take 
significant action too, in order to avoid temperature increases above 2.0 °C.  This chapter 
seeks to answer the question, “What are the gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation 
policy architecture?” 
First for discussion is the proposed carbon tax in South Africa. This will be followed by 
the implementation of REDD+ so far in Africa. Thereafter, the discussion will move to 
CDM implementation in Africa. The chapter ends with a discussion of NAMA. 
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2.2 Carbon Tax in South Africa 
A few background facts about the country, South Africa, are apposite here. South Africa 
is a middle-income developing country whose economy is built on the wealth of its 
mineral resources and its primary sectors;85 its population was estimated to be roughly 50 
million in 2010.86 South Africa is the most industrialised country in Africa with well-
developed mining, transport, energy, manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, and services 
sectors. The South African economy is powered by coal87 and its contribution to the 
global pool of greenhouse gases is 1.8 percent.88 Its total emissions in 2000 were 
estimated to be 461 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e).89 Eighty-three 
percent of emissions are derived from energy supply and consumption, 7 percent from 
industrial processes, 8 percent from agriculture, and 2 percent from the waste sector.90 
In 2011, South Africa formally published its National Climate Change Response Policy. 
The Policy has two objectives: 
 Effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts through 
interventions that build and sustain South Africa’s social, economic and 
environmental resilience and emergency response capacity.  
 Make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas 
(GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system within a timeframe that 
enables economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.91 
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South Africa has also developed what is called Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). 
The idea behind the LTMS was to develop broad and sound mitigation scenarios that will 
form the basis of a long-term climate policy.92 LTMS is a detailed study of South 
Africa’s mitigation potential. Acting on the LTMS, South Africa announced at COP15 
(the 2009 climate change conference in Copenhagen Denmark) that its emissions should 
peak in the period from 2020 to 2025, remain stable for around a decade, and decline 
thereafter in absolute terms.93 
As part of its international commitment to fight climate change, South Africa is 
considering the use of a carbon tax to reduce its emissions; South Africa National 
Treasury started experimenting with environmental taxes in 2006. In 2010, it published a 
Discussion Paper on various designs of a carbon tax. 
The proposed tax would cover all direct, stationary sources, and process emissions. The 
tax would apply to methane, carbon dioxide, and nitrous oxide.94 The implementation 
was meant to start in October 2014 in two phases: the first running to 2019, and the 
second to 2025; but it has now been shifted to 2015. The initial proposed rate is ZAR 120 
per tCO2e, applying above a certain threshold of a firm’s emissions, and would increase 
10 percent annually until 2019-20.95 
In the first phase, the tax would only apply to 40 percent of total emissions (basic 
threshold at 60 percent). Trade-exposed sectors with competitiveness concerns and 
process emissions would receive an additional exemption of 10 percent each. An offset 
mechanism is also envisaged to offset carbon tax liability up to a maximum of 5 or 10 
percent. Revenue would not be earmarked, but consideration given to environmental 
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issues when determining revenue use, particularly to energy efficiency and assistance to 
low-income households.96 
The proposed tax is not the first tax targeted at greenhouse gas emissions in South Africa. 
There is already in place a levy of ZAR 3.5c/ kWh on electricity generated from fossil 
fuel.97 There is also a tax on new vehicles in place;98 new passenger cars are taxed on 
carbon dioxide emissions above 120 g/km at a fixed rate of ZAR 75 per g/km. For 
example, if a new passenger car emits 200 g/km of carbon dioxide, it will be taxed on the 
80 g/km emitted above the 120 g/km threshold. At the suggested flat rate of ZAR 75 per 
g/km, such a vehicle will attract a carbon tax of ZAR 6,000.99 This particular tax seeks to 
reduce emissions from the transport sector; it is targeted at the manufacturers as well as 
buyers of vehicles that are not environmentally friendly. The proposed tax differs from 
the already implemented taxes because it is a universal carbon tax.  
Ideally, for a tax to be environmentally effective, the tax rate should equal the social 
marginal damages from producing an additional unit of emissions or, more or less 
equivalently, the social marginal benefit from abating a unit of emissions.100  
Thus, the optimal tax rate would be where the marginal benefit of abatement equals the 
marginal cost of abatement.101 To arrive at the optimal rate, the government would need 
to estimate both the marginal abatement cost curve and the marginal abatement benefit 
curve. Estimating the marginal abatement cost curve and the marginal benefit curve is an 
uncertain science. Climate change as a global problem means that damage costs have to 
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be assessed globally.102 Asking local polluters to pay the global damage costs seems 
unfair. Such a system would probably succeed if there were an international carbon tax. 
The National Treasury of South Africa seems to appreciate this fact when it said: 
 The tax rate should, over time, be equivalent to the marginal external 
damage costs of GHGs to affect appropriate incentives. However, in the 
absence of an international climate change agreement and therefore a 
global emissions pricing system, a partial, rather than full, internalisation 
of the externality will be considered as an interim measure.103  
Even if a uniform tax is adopted, the end result is that polluters would undertake to 
implement those emission reductions that are cheaper than paying the tax, because each 
emitter weighs the cost of emissions control against the cost of emitting and paying the 
tax.104 It does not offer an incentive to polluters that want to make aggressive cuts in 
emissions. 
Another thing that emerges from the literature on environmental taxes is that 
environmental taxes cannot guarantee environmental certainty. This is due to the fact 
that, at the time of setting the tax, policy makers do not have all the required information 
regarding technological progress and price sensitivities;105 so, setting the tax at the 
required level to meet the emission target becomes difficult.  New entrants into the 
polluting industry can also upset the whole arrangement, in that their activities could lead 
to increased emissions.106 To ensure that the environmental goal is not diluted by reason 
of new polluting sources, the tax level has to be adjusted. 
Environmental certainty is important when considering South Africa’s LTMS target, 
which anticipates a peak, a plateau, and a decline. A peak by 2020 or 2025 and a decline 
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thereafter mean that the environmental outcome must be certain as of 2015, when tax is 
meant to be introduced until 2020 or 2025. The policy makers in South Africa are well 
aware of this point. In the National Climate Response White Paper, the government said:  
 Although a carbon tax does not set a fixed quantitative limit on GHG 
emissions over the short-term, such a tax—at an appropriate level and 
phased in over a period to the “correct” level—will provide a strong price 
signal to both producers and consumers to change their behaviour over the 
medium- to long-term. The National Treasury’s carbon tax policy will seek 
to primarily stimulate behaviour change through the price mechanism, and 
as a secondary benefit, generate a revenue stream that may allow fiscal 
decisions over time that support climate change policy and broader 
sustainable development objectives.107 
The government’s view that the tax will generate revenue and that this revenue will be 
used to stimulate other sustainable development goals is sound, but claims about the tax 
instilling a behavioural change may be an overestimation. This claim can only be 
satisfactorily investigated ex post, but if Nigeria’s experience with the use of pollution 
charges reveals anything, it is that taxes or pollution charges by themselves are not 
enough to instil behavioural change. 
Environmental taxation has, from the onset, been an integral part of the gas flaring legal 
regime in Nigeria, and has been one of their government’s frontline policies in seeking to 
eliminate flaring. In principle, Section 3 of the Associated Gas Reinjection Act outlaws 
gas flaring, but allows polluters to continue to flare on payment of a fine. The Section 
provides as follows: 
3. Flaring of gas to cease 
Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no company engaged in the 
production of oil or gas shall after 1 January, 1984 flare gas produced in 
association with oil without the permission in writing of the Minister     
[1985 No.7.] 
(2) Where the Minister is satisfied after 1 January 1984 that utilisation or 
re-injection of the produced gas is not appropriate or feasible in a 
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particular field or fields, he may issue a certificate in that respect to a 
company engaged in the production of oil or gas- 
(a) Specifying such terms and conditions, as he may at his discretion 
choose to impose, for the continued flaring of gas in the particular field or 
fields; or 
(b) Permitting the company to continue to flare gas in the particular field 
or fields if the company pays such sum as the Minister may from time to 
time prescribe for every 28.317 Standard cubic metre (SCM) of gas flared: 
Provided that, any payment due under this paragraph shall be made in the 
same manner and be subject to the same procedure as for the payment of 
royalties to the Federal Government by companies engaged in the 
production of oil.108 
The penalty was initially fixed at 2 kobo (equivalent to US$0.0009 in 1985) against the 
oil companies for each 1,000 standard cubic feet (scf) of gas flared. In 1990, the penalty 
was increased to 50 kobo/10,000 scf. This was further raised to 10 naira/1000 scf in 1998. 
In 2008, the penalty was raised to US$3.50 (equivalent to 560 naira today) for every 
1,000 scf of gas flared. Nigeria is also planning to raise the penalty to the international 
market value of the tax flared.109 In 2012, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) confirmed that flare is only down by 15 percent, which means 85 percent of 
Nigerian gas is still being flared.110 
The Nigerian situation is relevant to the South African situation because the enactment of 
the tax in Nigeria followed the “slow ramp-up” approach, which is what the National 
Treasury of South Africa wants to use as well. In a “slow ramp-up” approach,111 the tax 
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is introduced gradually over time, starting with a low initial rate or a narrow initial base 
and then increasing the rate or base at a pre-announced schedule in order to reach the 
desired system.  
Setting the tax at the desired rate is complicated; this is evident in the proposed plan by 
Nigeria to set the flare penalty to the international market value of the gas flared. The 
market value of gas varies across continents.112 
Competitiveness concerns could also weaken the effectiveness of the proposed tax in that 
trade exposed sectors will seek to be exempted from the tax. There is no danger of this in 
a cap and trade program because of the opportunity offered by linking. Joining the ETS 
with the EU ETS and other ETS’ in other jurisdictions will ensure that companies that 
would have sought exemption from the tax will participate in cutting their emissions as 
the argument of being unduly exposed will no longer be tenable. 
What is more, a universal carbon tax is likely going to be regressive. This could 
aggravate the social inequality in South Africa. As stated in its national communication to 
the UNFCCC, 
There is high social inequality in a population of about 50 million people, revealed 
by a Gini coefficient of between 0.66 and 0.69, several poverty and human 
development indices emphasise this.113 
Thus, the revenue to be generated from the carbon tax has to go towards addressing the 
social inequality in South Africa, and not only to carbon mitigation measures.  
Ultimately, the effect of the proposed tax in South Africa can only be satisfactorily 
assessed after its implementation, which will start in 2015. This is meant to give 
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companies time to adjust to the new fiscal regime on climate change.114 Carbon tax and a 
tradable permit scheme are not mutually exclusive. They can complement each other. 
Carbon tax can be used for certain sectors of the economy, while a tradable permit 
scheme can cover the rest. This way the country will profit from the unique benefits of 
both policies. 
2.3 REDD+ in Africa 
REDD+ discussions within the UNFCCC negotiations had been on for a while, but it 
gathered momentum in 2005 when the Coalition for Rainforest Nations115–led by Costa 
Rica and Papua New Guinea—presented a formal proposal for reducing GHG emissions 
from deforestation to the 11th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC and first 
Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol (COP 11/CMP 1). At the same 
meeting, several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and scientists, led by 
Environmental Defense, reiterated earlier calls for inclusion of forests under Kyoto’s 
trading instruments.116  COP 11 requested that its Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) evaluate the issue of reducing emissions from 
deforestation and report back to UNFCCC COP 13/MOP 3 in December 2007.117 
REDD+ is meant to address the perceived gaps in the operation of the Clean 
Development Mechanism. The list of eligible activities under the CDM includes 
afforestation and reforestation,118 but expressly excluded measures to reduce 
                                                 
114
 Mike Cohen, ‘‘South Africa Delays Implementation of Carbon Tax Until 2015 ‘‘, Bloomberg (27 
February 2013). 
115
 Bangladesh, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay, and Vanuatu. See: 
<http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/nations/aspx>. 
116
 Griffiths & Martone, Seeing ‘REDD’? Forests, climate change mitigation and the rights of indigenous 
peoples and local communities  (Forest Peoples Programme May 2009) at 4. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 “Afforestation” is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period 
of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of 
natural seed sources while Reforestation” is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to 
36 
 
deforestation, and hence did not provide a means for CDM funding to help developing 
countries tackle deforestation.119 
REDD+ discussions further gained momentum with the publication of the Stern Review 
on the Economics of Climate Change.120 The Stern Review recommended thus: 
Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and has the potential to offer significant 
reductions fairly quickly. It also helps preserve biodiversity and protect 
soil and water quality. Encouraging new forests, and enhancing the 
potential of soils to store carbon, offers further opportunities to reverse 
emissions from land use change.121 
 
At the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Bali in December 2007, 
discussions on the inclusion of forests in climate change mitigation continued. In the Bali 
Action Plan, parties decided that national and international actions to mitigate climate 
change should include:  
Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing countries.122 
 
Parties were urged to:  
…explore a range of actions, identify options and undertake efforts, 
including demonstration activities, to address the drivers of deforestation 
relevant to their national circumstances, with a view to reducing emissions 
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from deforestation and forest degradation and thus enhancing forest carbon 
stocks due to sustainable management of forests.123 
The need to reduce emissions from deforestation was again reemphasised at COP 16 in 
Cancun, Mexico. Parties were urged to “collectively aim to slow, halt, and reverse forest 
cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, consistent with the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in Article 2”.124 
What is REDD+?  
As stated in the Cancun Agreements, REDD+ includes: 
(a) Reducing emissions from deforestation; 
(b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation; 
(c) Conservation of forest carbon stocks; 
(d) Sustainable management of forests; 
(e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.125 
It refers to a suite of interventions that aim to enhance the removal of GHG emissions 
through forest conservation, sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries.126 
REDD+ is important because deforestation is the second largest anthropogenic source of 
carbon dioxide after fossil fuels.127 Plants and trees remove carbon from the atmosphere 
through photosynthesis as they grow. However, when forest is cleared and soils are 
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disturbed through ploughing, the stored carbon is released back into the atmosphere. 
Deforestation is the major singular source of greenhouse gases emissions in Africa. 
Africa accounts for 20 percent of the global net CO2 emissions from land-use change.128 
Forest degradation of peat soils can generate emissions; peat soils generate emissions 
when they switch from anaerobic conditions to aerobic conditions through human 
interference. The switch occurs through the deposition of decaying matter in their 
waterlogged soils. The carbon and methane they sequester is released back to the 
atmosphere when decaying matter is deposited in them.129  
Forest degradation is very rampant in Africa and has been most severe in Nigeria, where 
more than 410,000 hectares of forest are lost to desertification annually.130 Less than 12.2 
percent of the country’s land is forested.131 Ghana also lost an average of 115,000 
hectares of forest per year between 2000 and 2005. Over the last 15 years, West Africa 
has lost almost 12 million hectares of tropical forest.132 Even though African forests 
constitute only 16 percent of the world’s total, the deforestation rate in Africa is more 
than six times the world’s average.133 
African forests play a crucial role in the global carbon cycle, since tropical forests store 
more carbon than other types of forests.134 African forests account for 17 percent of the 
world’s forest cover with over 582 million hectares of forested land. These include the 
world’s second largest rainforest, covering 180 million hectares across the Congo 
Basin.135 
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REDD+ is not only a mitigation measure; it has adaptation as a co-benefit. Tropical 
forests influence precipitation and can have a cooling effect on a region through 
increased evaporation and cloud cover.136 Urban forests and trees provide green 
infrastructure – shade, evaporative cooling, and rainwater interception, storage and 
infiltration – in cities.  
They can play a significant role in urban adaptation to climate variability and change by 
reducing temperatures during heat waves.137 Forests contribute to regulating river flows 
(base flows during dry seasons and peak flows during rainfall events), thereby 
minimising risks related to water scarcity and floods.138 Research in Africa shows that 
leguminous trees can make agriculture more drought-resilient by improving water 
infiltration and increasing productivity through nitrogen fixation.139 
REDD+ also has other benefits, such as protection of biodiversity and economic 
empowerment for forest dependent communities, in that it offers incentives to protect 
forest stock. 
To participate in REDD+, developing countries are to develop:  
(a) A national strategy or action plan; 
(b) A national forest reference emission level and/or forest reference level 
or, if appropriate, as an interim measure, subnational forest reference 
emission levels and/or forest reference levels, in accordance with national 
circumstances; 
(c) A robust and transparent national forest monitoring system for the 
monitoring and reporting of the activities.140 
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Developed country parties are to support developing country parties’ action in this regard 
through capacity building, technology transfer, and finance and general support for 
results-based demonstration activities.141 
The final form of REDD+ is yet to be known, as parties failed to agree on how to 
measure emissions reductions from REDD+, i.e. monitoring, reporting and verification of 
carbon emissions from REDD+ at COP 18.142 This is important for REDD+ 
demonstration projects to get underway.143 
The early implementation of REDD+ in Africa, i.e. REDD+ readiness projects, presents a 
worrying sign. In the fall of 2009, the Ogiek people of Kenya, a forest-dependent 
community, were forcibly displaced due to the introduction of REDD+ in the Mau 
Forest.144 Over 22,000 people were violently evicted from the Mubende and Kiboga 
districts in Uganda to make way for the UK-based New Forests Company to plant 
trees.145  Evicted successful farmers were reduced to becoming poorly paid plantation 
peons on the land from which they were evicted.146 Natural forests are also being 
converted to monoculture plantations in the name of REDD+.147 This has led some 
scholars to advocate for the rights-based approach to REDD+, i.e. the recognition of the 
rights of forest-dependent communities.148  
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The Cancun Agreements sought to remedy this defect by providing that the rights of 
indigenous peoples must be respected by developing country parties in REDD+ 
activities;149 these parties must show how they are going to safeguard the rights of 
indigenous people in REDD+ implementation. 
Another challenge facing REDD+ implementation in Africa is the underlying drivers of 
deforestation. It is already recognised at the UNFCCC level that a good REDD+ must 
address these drivers,150 which are economic and difficult to reverse.  
Logging is one of the drivers of deforestation in Africa. Forestry is an important source of 
livelihood in Africa, as it is a source of employment for approximately 500,000 
people.151 The contribution of forestry to the African economy is still marginal, but the 
fact that people depend on it for daily survival cannot be discountenanced. 
Another driver of deforestation in Africa is fuel wood extraction. Almost two thirds of 
global fuel wood use is in Africa,152 where it is a significant source of energy. Current 
levels of extraction largely exceed the regenerative capacity of the forests. Fuel wood 
extraction is even greater than industrial wood extraction.153 
A third driver of deforestation and loss of forest cover is agriculture. Conversion of 
forested land to cropland by farmers is one of the ways agriculture contributes to 
deforestation in Africa. Shifting cultivation and use of fire in farming is another way 
agriculture contributes to deforestation on the continent.154 
                                                 
149
 Cancun Agreements supra note 48 at 26. 
150
 Ibid at 13. 
151
 Matieu Henry et al., “Implementation of REDD+ in Sub Saharan Africa: State of Knowledge, 
Challenges, and Opportunities” (2011) Environ Dev Econ 16 381 at 384. 
152
 Ibid at 385. 
153
 Ibid at 384. 
154
 Global Land Report No 5 supra note 119 at 37. 
42 
 
Another driver of forest degradation in Africa is artisan mining. There is a noticeable 
trend towards “de-agrarianization”155 in rural households; up to 50 percent of rural 
incomes in Africa are derived from off-farm sources.156 Artisan mining is fast becoming 
a preferred non-farm occupation.157 In Ghana, the desire to earn foreign exchange from 
the mining sector conflicts with the objectives of REDD+.158 
Attempts to address these drivers appear to be failing. The Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
Policy in Nigeria was designed to address reliance on a fuel wood extraction as a source 
of energy but it is not producing the desired results. This has been attributed to 
institutional and policy inefficiencies.159 The reason why a thriving domestic gas market 
is yet to develop in Nigeria goes beyond institutional failures. Fuel wood extraction is 
cheap compared to all other sources; even if gas supply penetrates the hinterlands in 
Nigeria, people will still resort to fuel wood extraction for their energy needs because it is 
less costly. In fact, there is no cost involved with fuel wood extraction for energy needs. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the drivers of deforestation are economic; this infers 
that part of the solution must also be economic. Creating a value for maintaining forest 
cover can help in changing behaviour. Forest-dependent communities and farmers are 
key actors in a successful REDD+. They must be actively engaged in the battle to 
maintain forest cover, and the only way they can be engaged is if they see the practical 
benefits of REDD+.  
Farmers will be better able to internalise concepts such as agro-forestry160 and better 
farming practices when they see the monetary incentives for maintaining forest cover. 
Monetary incentive has proven to be successful in maintaining forest cover in Costa Rica, 
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where land owners were promised 45 dollars for maintaining it. Forest cover increased 
from 21 percent in 1977 to 51 percent in 2005 as a result of this monetary incentive 
coupled with other measures.161  
The monetary incentive should be equal to or greater than the returns from alternative 
uses of land. This will create enthusiasm among the farmers and cause less friction. 
Creating economic incentives is the only way REDD+ can attain its objectives of curbing 
emissions and reducing poverty.162 If REDD+ results in enhancement of livelihood rather 
than loss of livelihood, it will face less opposition from rights activists. 
2.4 CDM in Africa 
The purpose of CDM is as contained in Article 12 (2) of the Kyoto Protocol, which 
provides as follows: 
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties 
not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in 
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist 
Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3. 
 
CDM allows developing countries to participate in stabilizing the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere despite not having QELRCs (Quantified 
Emission Limitation and Reduction Commitments) under the Protocol. It allows 
developed countries (known as Annex 1 countries under the Protocol) to identify and 
invest in emission-reducing projects in developing countries, and to claim credits for 
the reductions achieved. Conceptually, this investment is meant to reduce compliance 
costs for developed country parties, and result in transfer of funds and new 
technology to developing countries. The range of sector and source categories that 
could be addressed via CDM project activities is indicated in the table found in 
Appendix A.  
                                                 
161
 Stern Review supra note 74 at 544. 
162
 Cancun Agreements supra note 48 at 26. 
44 
 
A developing country is at liberty to implement CDM projects without the support of a 
developed country. All it needs to do is identify a project that will result in emissions 
reduction and seek registration for the project before the CDM Executive Board; then it 
will need to source for potential buyers for the certified emissions reduction units (CER). 
This is called unilateral CDM; project activities that do not have an Annex I party letter 
of approval at the time of registration are known as "unilateral CDM" projects.163 
Ratification of the protocol is a condition precedent to participation in CDM.164 Most 
African countries have ratified the Protocol. A developing country must also have a 
Designated National Authority for CDM.165 According to Manso, the functions of the 
DNA include: serving as the focal point between investors and the host country 
government; providing potential projects for investors; processing framework agreements 
with investors; ensuring that an environmental impact assessment is carried out before 
approving projects and considering the assessment reports carefully; providing legal 
advice for project investors; coordinating with other relevant official entities and 
authorities within the host country; drawing up standardized baselines; monitoring 
ongoing CDM projects; granting export of emissions rights (CERs); conducting public 
relations and providing information on CDM implementation in the host country through 
advertisements in the media and through the web. It is also to design and establish an 
evaluation procedure that adopts international eligibility criteria to assess the contribution 
of the prospective CDM projects to sustainable development in the host country.166 
One of the most important criteria for CDM projects is that it should contribute to 
sustainable development in a developing country.167  The CDM Rules and the Kyoto 
Protocol do not offer any common guidelines or indicators for assessing the sustainable 
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development benefits of a CDM project. It is left for the host country to formulate its own 
definition of sustainable development.  
Another criterion a CDM project has to meet is “additionality”.  A CDM project activity 
is additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced 
below those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project 
activity.168 The baseline for a CDM project activity is the scenario that reasonably 
represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that would occur 
in the absence of the proposed project activity.169 The alternative scenario may be the 
“business as usual” scenario (the continuation of current emission levels in the absence of 
the CDM project), or some other scenario that involves a gradual reduction in emissions 
intensity. 
The CDM project process has been summarised as follows: 
• Obtaining formal written approval from the DNA of the Host Country for 
the proposed project and an affirmation that the project will assist the Host 
Country to achieve sustainable development; 
• Obtaining formal written authorization from the Party to the Kyoto 
Protocol of the voluntary participation of the proposed Project 
Participants; 
• Creation of a Project Design Document containing details of the project 
activity, the proposed monitoring methodology and baseline, the crediting 
period of the project, the Project Participants and the method by which the 
participants will communicate with the CDM Executive Board; 
• Review and Validation of the Project Design Document by a DOE; 
• Registration of the project as a CDM Project with the CDM Executive 
Board; operating the project in a manner which reduces, abates or 
sequesters Greenhouse Gases; 
• Monitoring the emission reductions achieved by the project in 
accordance with the monitoring plan; 
• Periodic review and Verification of the achieved emission reductions by 
another DOE; certification to the CDM Executive Board by the second 
DOE that the project has achieved the number of emission reductions 
verified and a request to the CDM Executive Board to issue CERs for the 
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amount of Greenhouse Gas abatement, which occurred during the 
Verification period; 
• Issuance of CERs by the CDM Executive Board for the Verification 
period.170 
 
The participants in the CDM project process include the following: project developer 
(who might also be the CER purchaser), the CDM Executive Board,171 Designated 
National Authority, Designated Operational Entity,172 and the CER purchaser (when they 
are not also the project developer). 
There are two CDM project types: the traditional CDM and the programmatic CDM. The 
traditional CDM involves a single big project that leads to greenhouse gas cuts, while the 
programmatic CDM involves a series of small scale projects lumped together that lead to 
greenhouse gas emissions. A programmatic CDM (also called POA) is a voluntary 
coordinated action by a private or public entity that coordinates and implements any 
policy/measure or stated goal (e.g., incentive schemes and voluntary programmes) that 
leads to anthropogenic GHG emission reductions, or to net anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
removals by sinks that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the POA, 
via an unlimited number of CDM program activities (CPAs).173 
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Africa is more involved in the programmatic CDM than the traditional CDM. Four out of 
every fifth multi-country CDM “program of activity” is hosted in Africa.174 This is due to 
the fact that a lot of African countries do not have large-scale single projects that can 
generate a lot of CERs. Thus, the majority of CDM projects in Africa are programmatic 
in nature. 
One of the limitations of the CDM as a mitigation platform is that it is investment based. 
The trend is for project developers and financiers to invest in relatively low risk projects. 
Consequently, if a project can lead to greenhouse gas emissions but has not been tested or 
proven, investors will be reluctant to invest in such projects. So, CDM projects are in the 
main low hanging fruit projects. According to the World Bank State and Trends of the 
Carbon Market 2012, 
Carbon revenues continue to leverage relatively low-risk investments in 
proven technologies by improving the marginal rates of return and 
enhance the chances of the projects being developed and remaining 
operational. As a result, after almost completely exhausting the market for 
HFCs and N2O, most primary CERs in recent years have been generated 
from wind, hydro, and other renewable energy projects.175        
The shift towards renewable energy investment is very good for the African continent in 
that it can help solve their energy deficit176 and can aid in the transition away from fossil 
fuels. Renewable energy projects generate less carbon credits per output, so it remains to 
be seen how long investors’ appetite in renewable energy projects will be maintained.  
Renewable energy projects account for 70 percent of the current CDM projects, but the 
CERs from them remain small compared to their number. See Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below.   
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Figure 2.2 shows the total number of CERs that were expected before the end of 2012 for 
the major project categories, according to the PDDs in all the CDM projects that are 
alive. 
As noted in the World Bank report quoted above, the shift towards renewable energy 
projects was not deliberate; it was necessitated by the dwindling availability of hydro 
fluorocarbon and nitrous oxide projects—natural investors’ preference.  
CDM has not contributed much to greenhouse gas mitigation in Africa, where landfill gas 
projects top the list of CDM projects.  Thirty-six of the currently registered CDM projects 
in Africa are landfill gas and methane avoidance projects (see Appendix B). Landfill gas 
projects convert methane from decomposing garbage into power, while methane 
avoidance projects seek to utilize waste sawdust for pellet/briquette production and are 
small-scale in nature. Contribution of waste to greenhouse gas emissions in Africa is 
negligible compared to the emissions from land use change and fossil fuel use. Emissions 
from the waste sector accounted for just 2 percent of South Africa’s total emissions for 
the year 2000.177 South Africa has more landfill gas projects and hosts more CDM 
projects that any other country in Africa. 
The project-by-project mitigation under the CDM does not account for the expected 
growth rate in Africa’s emissions. Africa has only hosted 27 biomass cook stove projects 
thus far (as shown in Appendix B), which are meant reduce black carbon emissions. The 
projects are meant to replace open fire cooking, which is common in the rural areas in 
Africa. This is small in view of the fact that Africa is the second highest contributor of 
black carbon emissions. See Figure 2.3. 
                                                 
177
 South Africa’s Second National Communication under UNFCCC supra note 78 at ix. Emissions from 
the waste sector in Nigeria for the year 2000 was 2,377 CO2e, less than 2 percent of its emissions for the 
year 2000. National Environmental Economic and Development Study (Needs for Climate Change in 
Nigeria) (Federal Ministry of Environment Special Climate Change Unit, September 2010), online: 
<http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/nigerianeeds.pdf>. Emissions from the waste sector in 
Egypt for the year 2000 were 19.5 MtCO2e, 10 percent of the country’s total emissions for the year 2000. 
Egypt’s Second National Communication under the UNFCCC (Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, 
May 2010), online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/egync2.pdf>. 
50 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Global BC Emissions Based on Year 2000 Estimates 
Source: US EPA Report to Congress on Black Carbon: Department of the Interior, Environment, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (March 2012) at 97. 
Currently, South Africa has 16 wind CDM projects and 6 solar CDM projects, which are 
meant to supply 2,756 megawatts to the national grid.178 However, the Department of 
Energy anticipates the introduction of 41,346 MW in the next 17 years to enable South 
Africa to diversify its electricity generation mix to sources other than coal.179 
To address this shortcoming, there have been suggestions to reform CDM from its project 
nature to cover sectors of the economy in developing countries. Conceptually, sectorial 
CDM can help developing countries participate more in the goal of stabilizing 
greenhouse gas emissions, but it will be difficult to set a baseline for a sector of the 
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economy.180 It has been suggested that additionality is not needed for sectorial CDM;181 
the effect of this is that certainty of emissions reductions is not guaranteed. 
Generally, CDM does not guarantee environmental certainty, as it is very difficult to 
define with certainty what would have happened in the absence of a project.182 CDM 
baselines for some projects do not relate to existing practices but to projections of future 
use. The Bujugali Dam project in Uganda is one example of this. In this project, CER 
was calculated on the assumption that Uganda would be afflicted with load shedding 
(power shortage), which would lead to increased use of diesel generators and automotive 
oil. While it is true that there was load shedding in Uganda (12 hours per day)183 before 
the project, the load shedding scenario was projected to continue indefinitely in the 
Project Design Document,184 because the crediting period goes from 8 April 2012 to 8 
April 2019. The project is meant to reduce 6,328,000 tCO2e for the 7-year period. The 
increased use of diesel generators should ordinarily decline during the first year of the 
project. As a matter of fact, there is currently no load shedding in Uganda now.185 
The EU ETS, the biggest buyer of CDM credits, has expressed concerns over the 
environmental integrity of CDM projects being supplied to it, and has decided to ban 
credits from industrial gas projects such as hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) and adipic acid 
N2O projects for use in its ETS after April 2013.186 
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CDM does not allow companies in host countries to internalise the cost of greenhouse gas 
externality. This is important given the role of multinational corporations in the fight 
against climate change. Apart from the foreign multinational corporations in Africa, the 
list of homegrown multinational companies is also increasing.187 According to the Stern 
Review: 
Project-based carbon finance does not internalise the cost of the 
greenhouse gas externality for firms and consumers in the host country or 
for goods exported from the country. Project-based carbon finance acts as 
a form of subsidy; it reduces the emissions from a particular project, but it 
does not affect the demand for high carbon goods and services across the 
economy as a whole, so the overall level of emissions can remain high or 
increase. It also creates issues of moral hazard and gaming, where there 
are incentives to manipulate the system to increase the rewards 
received.188  
The case of Sasol is apt in this regard; Sasol is a beneficiary of CDM finance for a nitrous 
oxide abatement project at its Secunda and Sasolburg plants. 
While this project will reduce Sasol’s emissions by one million tonnes of CO2e a year, its 
new plant in South Africa will emit about 30 times that amount per year.189 CDM is 
indirectly encouraging multinationals to pollute even more. The CDM Executive Board 
rejected the application for failing to pass an additionality test. Peter Geek, the supply 
manager, was reported to have addressed the failed CDM pipeline project at a public 
meeting: 
Yes, we are indeed trying to get some carbon finance for this pipeline … 
(But) we have this problem of additionality; we think there’s a case to be 
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made for that … The biggest issue is additionality; we would have done 
this project anyway.190  
Sasol also sought CDM finance for a 645-kilometre natural gas pipeline from 
Mozambique to its Secunda plant.191 The Secunda plant project had been conceived since 
1999 before the Kyoto Protocol came into effect. The company had already costed the 
project and did not find it prohibitively expensive. This perverse incentive created by the 
CDM is also one of the reasons EU ETS placed a ban on CDM industrial gas projects.192 
More importantly, the European Union wants the CDM to be progressively phased out 
for advanced developing countries.193 As a statement of this intention, credits from new 
CDM projects registered after 2012 can only be used in the EU ETS if they are located in 
a Least Developed Country (LDC). Credits from CDM projects registered after 2012 in a 
developing country will only be allowed if the developing country has a bilateral 
agreement with the EU.194 This decision is both good and bad for Africa. The majority of 
the LDCs are in Africa, where there are currently 31;195 this will encourage CDM 
investment in LDCs. However, the remaining 23 developed countries (DCs) in Africa—
with the exception of South Africa who have not really benefited much from CDM—can 
no longer rely on CDM as a mitigation platform, as this decision will discourage 
investors from investing in carbon offset projects in the DCs, in view of the fact the EU 
ETS is the biggest buyer of offset credits. 
Beyond this, as part of reforms of its ETS, the EU has reduced the volume of 
international credits that are eligible for compliance purposes in the third phase of the 
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scheme.196 A total of 1,400 million tonnes of CERs and ERUs were eligible for 
compliance by installations during Phase II of the scheme, representing approximately 13 
percent of the average allocation in the period 2008-2012 (about 280 MtCO2e per 
year).197 The import cap for Phase III is 1,700 MtCO2e.198 This reform, coupled with the 
fact that the EU ETS is currently oversupplied with CDM credits and declining market 
prices for CERs,199 could discourage further investments in CDM. 
2.5 National Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) 
The concept of NAMAs emerged in 2007 at the Bali Climate Change conference. As part 
of its long term global goal for emissions, the Bali Action Plan reductions called for “[the 
implementation of] Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions by developing country 
parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, 
financing, and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner”.200 
The Cancun Agreement moved the NAMA process forward by creating a NAMA 
registry.201 
Nationally appropriate mitigation actions are voluntary commitments that non-Annex I 
parties have set up for proposal to the UNFCCC to limit the growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2020.  NAMA is an opportunity for developing countries to green their 
respective economies while trying to develop themselves; it is meant to help developing 
country parties avoid the carbon intensive pathways on which developed economies are 
founded. NAMAs provide guidance for future mitigation policies in developing 
countries.202 Due to the intricate link between mitigation and development, NAMAs are 
explicitly framed in the context of national appropriateness and sustainable 
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development.203 As part of commitment to NAMA, developing countries are expected to 
improve the content and frequency of national communications—including inventories—
and to create comprehensive, low-carbon sustainable development strategies.204 
There are two types of NAMAs: unilateral NAMAs, which are financed and supported 
entirely by the host country, and supported NAMAs, which will be implemented if 
provided with the necessary international support.205 
To date, nineteen African countries have identified with the NAMA concept. They are 
Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, and Mali. In September 2012, Mali and Ethiopia sought 
support by submitting NAMAs to the prototype NAMA Registry.206 Mali is planning 
NAMAs in the renewable energy and forestry sectors, while Ethiopia is seeking support 
for the development of an inter-urban electric rail powered by renewable electricity.207 
Tunisia is seeking support for electricity generation from concentrated solar power 
(CSP), solar photovoltaic.208 Other areas that Tunisia’s NAMA seeks to address include 
reducing N2O emissions in the phosphate industry, reuse of treated waste water to aid 
agriculture, increasing forest cover through afforestation and reforestation, development 
of multimodal transport and transport of trucks by railways, and gas utilization plans in 
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the industrial and residential sectors.209 Tunisia’s solar project is projected to avoid 1.5 
MtCO2e per year.210 
Sierra Leone’s NAMA includes development of alternative energy sources such as 
biofuels, waste incineration programmes for energy production, sustainable agriculture, 
clean energy utilization, and improving forest governance to maintain the proportion of 
land area covered by forests to at least 3.4 million ha by 2015.211 
South Africa’s NAMA is also on renewable energy development; the initiative is meant 
to avoid 60 MtCO2 per year.212 
Energy efficiency, renewable energy development, conservation farming, and improving 
forest cover are common threads that run through the submitted African NAMAs. 
However, there are still significant knowledge gaps on how the submitted NAMAs will 
contribute to the accelerated cuts in emissions by 2020. To this end, COP 18 has 
established a work programme to further the understanding of the submitted NAMAs.213 
The work programme starts in 2013 and ends in 2014. The global warming outcome of 
the submitted NAMAs will be evaluated through the work programme, which is a 
capacity building exercise for the implementation of the submitted NAMAs.214 
A key challenge facing the NAMA initiative is that the currently submitted NAMAs of 
developing country parties are not adequate to reduce emissions to a level consistent with 
the 2 °C target.215 To bridge this significant emissions gap, developing countries that are 
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yet to identify with the NAMA concept were urged to formulate and submit their 
respective NAMAs at COP 18.216 
Another challenge facing NAMA is finance. There are presently no dedicated funds for 
the implementation of NAMAs. A financial commitment made by developed countries to 
support the NAMA concept is yet to be delivered.217 COP 18 also did not resolve the 
issue; this is important since the majority of NAMAs are supported NAMAs. It is being 
speculated that the newly created Green Climate Fund will be the channel of support for 
NAMA, but the fund is yet to come into operation.218  The goal of NAMA is for 
aggressive cuts in emissions by 2020, but as of 2013, funding is yet to be delivered for it, 
with just 7 years to go until the set date. 
Leveraging private finance by removing barriers to investment could help in financing 
NAMA, but the fact that some NAMAs are non-market in nature could prove to be an 
obstacle in attracting private finance. As stated in the NAMA Report 2012, 
The link between NAMAs and the private sector is much less obvious to 
entrepreneurs than it was when the CDM and JI mechanisms were 
introduced. Two reasons are mentioned: First, private sector actors are 
direct beneficiaries of CDM revenues, while NAMAs support is delivered 
to governments who decide how to disburse it. This may create uncertainty 
about how support will be used or accessed. Second, the CDM developed 
against the background of firm reduction targets that gave an indication of 
the future market size. For NAMAs, it is not yet clear how efficient the 
mechanism will be in achieving GHG emission reductions.219 
2.6 Summary Conclusions 
The gaps in Africa`s climate change mitigation architecture identified in this Chapter are 
as follows: 
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• A carbon tax does not guarantee environmental certainty unless complemented by 
a tradable permit scheme; certainty is important if African countries are to 
effectively contribute to global climate change mitigation. 
• The economic drivers of deforestation threaten the successful implementation of 
REDD+ in Africa. 
• CDM does not guarantee environmental certainty and it does not encourage 
polluting companies in Africa to make cuts in their emissions. 
• NAMA implementation is threatened by lack of funds. 
 The next question to determine is whether the proposed emissions trading scheme can 
close the gaps in Africa’s mitigation policy architecture, as discussed in this chapter. This 
will be examined in the succeeding chapters. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Emissions Trading as a Climate Change Policy Option 
in Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will show how the proposed emissions trading scheme can cover the gaps in 
Africa’s mitigation policy architecture. To do this, I will analyse some of the existing 
literature on the nature of emissions trading as a policy instrument, including its types to 
its evolution and theoretical framework. I will then show the justification for the policy in 
Africa.  
The justification part of this chapter will demonstrate the environmental need for such a 
policy within the UNFCCC context and other gains that could be made from 
implementing the policy. This will be followed by a discussion of the viability of the 
proposed scheme in Africa, which will answer the question of whether the potential to 
trade carbon exists in Africa; meaning whether there are enough sources for trading and 
institutions to support trading of carbon in Africa. 
3.2 Evolution of Emissions Trading 
An emissions trading scheme, in principle, seeks to fight pollution by setting a price on it. 
The reasoning behind this concept being that the more costly the government makes 
pollution, the more likely it is that companies would want to prevent it from happening. It 
is anchored on the Polluter Pays principle. The Polluter Pays principle states: 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.220 
                                                 
220
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 
Principle 16, 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
60 
 
It allows for flexibility in meeting environmental goals by allowing the market to dictate 
how to comply with environmental targets, as opposed to traditional regulation, which 
does not give room for flexibility, in that it specifies only one route to compliance.221 
Under an emissions trading scheme, each firm or nation has a binding reduction 
obligation, but each could meet this obligation either by making reductions itself, or by 
purchasing them from another firm or nation.  Emissions trading equalises the marginal 
cost of compliance between firms by transferring more of the pollution control burden to 
firms with low costs of control.222 
Economists also argue that emissions trading will foster technological innovation, 
because it creates incentives for firms to develop new technology in order to make more 
emissions reductions than the regulator requires; this is a result of the opportunity 
available to over-complying firms to sell the credits to other pollution sources. Stavins 
argues that emissions trading, “would promote dynamic efficiency", meaning that it 
would provide continuous incentives for developing better emissions control 
technologies.223  
Pigou is the father of pollution economics; he theorised that pollution is an externality, in 
the sense that those responsible for pollution do not really bear the damage costs 
associated with their actions. He argued that, in the face of a negative externality such as 
pollution, the appropriate remedy involves imposing a per-unit tax on the emissions from 
a polluting activity.224 
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The tax rate would be equal to the marginal external social damage caused by the last unit 
of pollution, at the efficient allocation. Faced with this tax on emissions, firms would 
“internalize” the externality. By minimizing their private costs, firms would 
simultaneously minimize the costs to society as a whole. Rational pollution control policy 
involved putting a price on pollution.225 
In 1960, Ronald Coase took a divergent opinion from Pigou; he argued that the market 
should be left to determine how to internalize the externality that is pollution; he asserted: 
 If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to 
understand that the right to do something which has an harmful effect 
(such as creation of smoke, noise, smell, etc.) is also a factor of 
production…. The cost of exercising such a right (of using a factor of 
production) is always the loss that is suffered elsewhere in consequence of 
that right-the inability to cross land, park car, to build a house, enjoy a 
view, to have peace and quiet or to breathe clean air.226  
He argued that, by making property rights—the right to emit—transferable, the market 
could pay a substantial role in allowing firms to internalize the externality. He pointed 
out that traditional pollution control regimes based purely on emissions limits provided 
no means for these property rights to flow to their highest valued use.227 
Dales took the insight further by arguing that legal regimes imposed by the government 
for pollution control had, in fact, already established a property right in the right to emit. 
This property right was not efficient because it was not transferable.228 According to 
Dales, the virtues of the market mechanism are that no person or agency has to set the 
price; it is set by the competition among buyers and sellers of rights.229 
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Crocker added a further insight by noting that this property approach fundamentally 
changes the information requirements on the bureaucracy, i.e. the pollution control 
authority’s responsibilities will not include the guesswork involved in attempting to 
estimate individual emitter and receptor preference functions.230 The authority does not 
have to know anything about the damage nor cost functions of each individual emitter 
while setting the level of allowable emissions. 
In 1971, Baumol and Oates applied the emissions trading theory to uniformly mixed 
pollutants, for which only the level, not the location, of the emissions mattered.231 In 
1972, Montgomery extended the theory to non-uniformly mixed pollutants, for which 
both the level and the location mattered.232 
It was not long before these insights had practical applications. The United States of 
America was the first to use emissions trading as an environmental policy instrument.  
According to Tietenberg, American scholars who were familiar with the literature on 
property rights actively canvassed for its use in the United States.233 They suggested that 
it might be possible to improve on the traditional approach of promulgating ambient air 
quality standards that specify the permissible legal threshold for concentrations of 
pollutants in the ambient air, and selection of desirable technologies by allowing firms to 
trade pollution control responsibility among themselves.234 They did this by providing 
empirical analyses showing Command and Control policy was not cost effective.235 
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The opportunity to explore emissions trading as a pollution control instrument came in 
1976. By this time, it had become clear that a number of regions designated as “non-
attainment areas” by the Clean Air Act would fail to achieve the ambient air quality 
standards by the deadlines mandated in the Act.236 The statute had mandated 
improvements in air quality in these regions; further economy growth would only make 
the air quality worse, contrary to the statute. The only recourse was to prohibit new 
businesses (those that would emit any of the pollutants responsible for the non-attainment 
in that region) from entering these regions until the air quality came within the ambient 
standards.237 This solution was politically unpopular among governors, mayors, and 
members of congress. 
It was at this point that the US Environmental Protection Agency warmed to the idea of 
emissions trading. Existing sources in the non-attainment areas were encouraged to 
voluntarily reduce their emissions levels below their current legal requirements. The EPA 
then certified these excess reductions as emission reduction credits. These credits became 
transferable to new sources that wished to enter the area. New sources were allowed to 
enter the non-attainment regions, provided they acquired emission reduction credits from 
other facilities in the region, and that total regional emissions would be lower (not just the 
same) after entry than they were before. This was accomplished by asking new sources to 
secure credits for 120 percent of the emissions they would add; the extra 20 percent of 
credits secured by new sources were retired as an improvement in air quality.238 
This offset program later became known as the Emissions Trading Program (ETP) when 
it was combined with three new policies: Bubble, Banking, and Netting.  
The Bubble policy allowed existing sources to buy credits from each other, as opposed to 
the offset program, which only allowed new sources to buy from existing sources. 
Banking allowed created credits to be saved for subsequent use or sale in the future. 
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Netting allowed sources undergoing expansion or modifications to escape the strict new 
source technology requirement, or the need to secure offsets for their remaining 
emissions, so long as any net increase in emissions fell below an established threshold. 
The government’s role in the emissions trading program was to certify each reduction 
before it qualified as credit. The control authority also approved credit trades on a case-
by-case basis.239 
As part of the solution to phase out lead from refined gasoline, the EPA also used 
emissions trading; this was in 1985 when a fixed amount of lead rights was allocated to 
refiners.  
Refiners who did not need their full share of authorized rights (due to early compliance) 
could sell their rights to other refiners.240 Since then, emissions trading has been used 
more widely by the United States. It was used to phase out ozone-depleting substances 
under the Montreal Protocol, and also used to combat acid rain through the Sulphur 
Allowance Program. Emissions trading is now a very popular concept and this is partly 
because it was included as part of the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme is the backbone of the EU’s fight against climate change, and likewise, 
the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme is at the heart of New Zealand’s fight 
against climate change. A nationwide emissions trading scheme will start in Australia in 
2015. The scheme is expected to cover 60 percent of the country’s 600 million tonnes of 
CO2 per year. Mexico and Republic of Korea have also introduced emissions trading 
schemes with their recently passed climate bills.241 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
In principle, emissions trading seeks to achieve cost effective allocation of the pollution 
control responsibility. Emissions trading can result in cost effective allocation of the 
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pollution control burden because plants typically have very different costs of controlling 
emissions. Emily Richman has best illustrated this concept with the following example:  
Suppose Power Plant A, which emits 1,000 tonnes of carbon, is required to 
reduce its emissions by 500 tonnes. Plant A already uses high quality 
pollution reduction technology; to reduce its emissions further, it would 
have to cut its output or invest in the latest, state-of-the-art technology, 
which limits emissions even further, but is very expensive. Thus, 
reductions would cost Plant A $1,000 per tonne. Plant B is also required to 
reduce its emissions by 500 tonnes. Plant B uses old, out-dated pollution 
reduction technology and could implement the technology that Plant A 
already uses at fairly low cost. Thus, Plant B could reduce emissions for 
$500 per tonne. If Plant A and B each meet their emissions reductions 
obligations themselves, without any trading, Plant A would spend 
$500,000 and B would spend $250,000. Overall, 1,000 tonnes of 
emissions reductions would cost the economy $750,000. On the other 
hand, under a trading program, Plant A could purchase emissions credits 
from Plant B at the lower price. Thus, Plant B would make 1000 tonnes of 
reduction for a total price of $500,000. Plant B could even charge Plant A 
a premium (anywhere between $501 and $999) and the reductions would 
still cost less than if Plants A and B each had to make reductions 
independently.242 
Price differentials can arise from disparate technology, as here, but can also stem from 
the development of efficient production processes in Plant B, Plant B's agreement to 
produce less, or a variety of other situations. 
To achieve cost effective allocation of the pollution control burden through traditional 
regulation, the control authority will need detailed information about the marginal cost of 
control of each polluting source. This will be used to set the appropriate standard for each 
source.
243
 This information is difficult to obtain and if obtained, it will be at great cost to 
the control authority. What is more, the information obtained will not be accurate because 
plant managers (who are familiar with the possible array of pollution control technologies 
and their associated costs) will not want to disclose their exact control cost to the control 
authority or to the legislature because the information about cost is part of what the plants 
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are using to maintain their competitive edge. What will usually happen is that plant 
managers will overstate their control costs to the control authority, which in the end will 
defeat the motive of cost effective allocation.244 To get out of this impasse, a market 
permit system seems to be a plausible solution. The market permit system will act as an 
incentive to the plant managers to act on the information they know, and it will save the 
control authority or the legislature the stress of information gathering. 
Thus, emission trading solves the problems of information and incentive that are inherent 
in a command and control approach because there is an existing market for the sale of 
excess permits.245 
However, the cost effective allocation of pollution control burden that emissions trading 
seeks to achieve could be undermined by high administrative costs as well as transaction 
costs. The ability of an emissions trading system to achieve full cost effectiveness 
depends on how smoothly the market operates. This is a function of administrative and 
transaction costs. Administrative costs include the costs of implementing and setting up 
an emissions trading scheme. Thus, an emissions trading scheme will not be cost 
effective if the administrative costs are higher than the cost of command and control, i.e. 
if the increase in administrative costs from moving to emissions trading to command and 
control policy dwarfs the savings in abatement costs.246 
Administrative costs could be in the form of setting up new institutions, such as setting 
up the registry system to keep track of permits or designing a compliance system. They 
could also come in the form of training for staff, designing rules for trading, monitoring 
emissions and enforcement of penalties for non-compliance.247 
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According to Tietenberg, transaction costs, “are costs other than price, incurred in the 
process of exchanging goods and services”.248 Transaction costs in an emissions trading 
scheme could arise from search and information, bargaining and decision.249 Search and 
information connotes costs of researching the market and finding buyers or sellers. 
Information about sellers and buyers is not readily available, so brokers step in to fill the 
gap. In the process, brokers absorb some fees. Costs arising from bargaining and decision 
connote negotiation costs; they come in form of time and fees for brokerage, legal and 
insurance services. 
The presence of high transaction costs in a market permit system will reduce the volume 
of permit trading and ultimately lead to high abatement costs. According to Stavins, the 
problem of transaction costs in an emissions trading system can be ameliorated in a 
market with a relatively large number of sources.250 As the pool of trading partners 
increases, it will be easier for sources to locate potential trading partners, thereby 
lowering transaction costs. 
The manner of initial allocation of permits can also play a role in tempering the potential 
effects of transaction costs. Allowances are generally distributed either through 
auctioning or for free, on the basis of historical or current emissions. Grandfathering, or 
endowment, is the distribution of permits for free on the basis of historical or current 
emissions. The argument for grandfathering is a political one; it is felt that the best way 
to build a constituency of support for a new ETS is through free allocation, because 
existing sources in the market can block the success of the program. The argument for 
auctioning is an economic one; auctioning allowance—apart from raising revenue for the 
government—will reduce transaction costs because there will be no need to search for 
potential sellers. The middlemen will be eliminated. There will be no legal fees incurred 
as a result of negotiation and drawing up contracts.251 
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The model of emissions trading chosen can also determine the level of cost effectiveness 
of a tradable permit scheme. 
There are three types of emissions trading: cap and trade, project-based trading and rate-
based trading. The most popular emissions trading type is cap and trade.  In a cap and 
trade program, an aggregate emissions cap is set specifying the amount of emissions 
permitted for sources participating in the program. The regulating authority of a cap and 
trade program creates rights to emit a specific quantity (e.g., 1 tonne) of a pollutant, 
called an allowance. The total number of allowances equals the level of the cap. To be in 
compliance, each emission source must surrender allowances equal to its actual 
emissions.252 It may buy or sell (trade) them with other emissions sources or market 
participants. 
The cap and trade model is attractive because it guarantees environmental certainty. The 
cap represents the maximum allowable emissions from sources participating in the 
scheme; it is the cap that does the work of reducing pollution. The integrity of the cap is 
very important and must be maintained; it is maintained through penalties and consistent, 
effective enforcement. Command and control policy does not rely on a cap, but rather on 
emission rates, which may lead to increased emissions as utilization rises. With a cap and 
trade program, there is no danger that new entrants into the polluting activity will dilute 
the emissions goal, as they would receive allowances from the cap set or purchase 
allowances from existing sources.253 
The cap and trade model is believed to also guarantee improved accountability because 
participating sources must account for every tonne of emissions by following protocols to 
ensure completeness, accuracy, and consistency of emission measurement; unlike other 
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environmental regimes that base compliance on periodic inspections and assume that the 
equipment is functioning.254  
Accurate measurement of emissions and timely reporting are integral to a successful cap 
and trade program. Participants in a cap and trade program must have the ability to 
measure emissions with sufficient accuracy and consistency. If one source uses a less 
accurate emission measurement method than another, and consequently underestimates 
its actual emissions, it could surrender fewer allowances than necessary to offset its 
emissions. If this scenario occurred, the emission goal (or cap) would not be met and by 
extension there will no active market for allowances.255 
Cap and trade programs make the most sense when emission sources have different costs 
for reducing emissions. This difference in costs makes room for a deal as sources with 
high marginal abatement costs have incentive to buy from sources with low marginal 
abatement costs. If sources are homogenous, their marginal abatement cost will most 
likely be the same and there will be little incentive to trade.256 
If the sources are few, there will be few opportunities for trading. This will create 
continued liquidity in the market. There must also be enough sources to create an active 
market before a cap and trade program can achieve the aim of meeting environmental 
goals cheaply.  
There are a number of different types of trading that must be considered. For example, 
CDM relies upon project-based trading. Project-based trading (also known as credit 
trading or offset trading) is generally not used as a standalone program. In a project based 
trading, emission offsets, or credits, are typically calculated by comparing actual 
emissions against a baseline.257 This is the type of trading that occurs in the CDM. The 
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baseline is an estimate of what emissions would be in a hypothetical situation (e.g., if the 
project had not been created).  
Baseline setting is the greatest challenge with project-based trading. Additionality is the 
gauge used to measure emission reductions in a project-based trading. Before credits are 
issued for emission reductions in a project based trading, it must be shown that the 
emissions reductions would not have occurred without the project. The emissions 
reductions must not be such that would have happened anyway. Project-based trading 
does not guarantee environmental certainty, as it is difficult to determine what would 
have happened in the absence of a project.258 
For project-based trading to be environmentally effective, the issue of non-additional 
projects must be tackled. This is usually done through increased regulatory oversight.  
Since each credit trade is unique, project participants are often required to develop a 
project-specific emission baseline for review by the regulating authority or other 
authorized experts. Even after the emission baseline is approved, credit trades will still 
have to be approved by the regulatory authority to ensure that the project does not dilute 
the emission goal coupled with continued monitoring of the project. As a result, 
transaction costs and uncertainty are high (the fear that the credit trade might not be 
approved is always there). The United States’ credit trading systems have generally 
performed poorly. The programs did not achieve significant economic or environmental 
benefits, nor did they introduce flexibility into the fairly rigid regulatory system 
governing criteria pollutants. The disappointing results of these programs have been 
attributed to their high transaction costs and the uncertainty and risk involved in 
obtaining the needed government approvals for credit trades.259 
To reduce administrative and transaction costs and to address additionality concerns, 
multi- project baselines are set. The multi-project baseline uses performance standards or 
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benchmarks for different types of projects. If the project results in emission rates lower 
than the standard, the project automatically receives credit equal to the difference 
between the baseline and the actual emissions. Standardizing baseline methodologies in 
advance can also help reduce transaction costs in project-based trading and limit the 
subjectivity inherent in a review of a project baseline.260 
However, standardizing does not guarantee that the emissions reductions are additional. 
Multi-project baselines may be difficult for some projects. Generally, project-based 
trading is ideal for sectors in which it is easier to measure an emission reduction than 
total mass emissions.261 
A second example to consider is a rate-based trading approach. Under this approach, the 
regulating authority determines a performance standard.262 It sets an emissions limit per 
unit of production, for example, 1,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide per kilowatt of electricity 
generated. Trading occurs when sources with emissions rates below the performance 
standard sell to sources whose emissions exceed the performance standard set. One 
drawback of rate-based trading is that if the activity level increases at a rate faster than 
the emission rate declines, sources can earn credits while total emissions increase. New 
entrants into the polluting activity can increase the pollution load.263 
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Rate-based trading is similar to environmental tax in that the regulating authority must 
periodically impose new rate standards to achieve and maintain an emission target and 
prevent additional emissions that may result from increased production. The data 
requirement in a rate-based trading tends to be more because the regulating authority has 
to collect activity level data. Activity level data gathering is essential in a rate based 
trading in order to revise the rate standard and to ensure that the emission goal is not 
diluted.264 
3.4 Economic Gains of the Policy 
A well-designed emissions trading policy can ensure the transfer of wealth from 
developed countries to Africa to the rural poor, to the government, as well as to private 
companies. Implementing REDD+ as an emissions trading scheme will not only address 
the economic drivers of deforestation in Africa, it will also help address rural poverty in 
Africa. REDD+ has been described earlier as performance-based financial incentive 
system for developing countries to reduce the rate of emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation. It has also been shown earlier (in Chapter Two) that the drivers of 
deforestation threatens REDD + implementation in Africa. Putting a value on forest cover 
through an emissions trading policy that engages small holder farmers and forest 
dependent communities in Africa will not only manage the tension that REDD+ would 
ordinarily generate but help ensure the flow of wealth to the rural areas in Africa.  
Emissions trading policy can ensure a proper benefit sharing between the government and 
forest dependent communities from the gains of REDD+.  This benefit sharing can be 
accomplished through an emissions trading policy when avoided deforestation achieved 
by farmers are denoted as carbon credits or units and these credits are then sold on behalf 
of the farmers by the government. 
Governments retain a percentage from the money realised from the sale and a percentage 
is given to the farmers. If farmers know also they can make money through avoided 
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deforestation, they will better internalize concepts such as agro forestry. They will also 
put an end to shifting cultivation, otherwise known as slash-and-burn agriculture. 
This will raise the profile of farming as a profession and stop the trend towards de-
agrarianisation. Erstwhile farmers who are now artisan miners would want to go back 
into farming, thereby addressing the driver of deforestation known as artisanal mining. 
Emissions trading schemes can also ensure that forest-dependent communities play their 
role in monitoring the progress of REDD+. While satellite analysis is important in MRV 
of REDD+, community involvement in the MRV of REDD+ must not be 
discountenanced, as forest degradation is very difficult to monitor remotely.265 Thus, 
forest owning families have to be involved in the process. Emissions trading can help 
ensure that they report to the government the forest degradation noticed in their 
communities. 
A regional emissions trading scheme involving polluting companies in Africa can lead to 
the transfer of wealth from developed countries to African companies. Carbon is steadily 
becoming the most traded commodity in the world.  The value of the global carbon 
market grew to 176 billion dollars in 2011. The global carbon market is divided into two 
market segments: the compliance market and the voluntary market. The compliance 
market is regulated by mandatory national, regional, or international reduction regimes. 
The voluntary carbon market includes any sectors and geographies not covered by 
mandatory cap-and-trade schemes or other regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Individuals, companies and governments purchase carbon offsets to mitigate 
their own greenhouse gas emissions, to cover some or their entire carbon footprint for 
particular activities or businesses, or just to display their concern for the environment. 
The voluntary carbon market value increased to 576 million dollars in 2011.266 The 
market value of EU ETS, the backbone of the global carbon market, increased to 148 
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billion dollars in 2011.267 The market is expected to grow all the more with new players 
entering the market. Though the EU ETS is currently oversupplied, there will be demand 
for international credits in the third phase of the scheme.  This demand will come from 
government buyers as well as private buyers because EU member countries committed to 
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The fact that the coverage of the 
scheme has been expanded to include all the major greenhouse gases will fuel the 
demand for international credits in the third phase. Other players are also coming in: 
Australia will start a nationwide cap and trade program in 2015. In November 2011, the 
Australian Parliament passed the Clean Energy Legislative Package as part of an effort to 
comply with Australia’s unconditional target of reducing net emissions by 5 percent 
below 2000 levels by 2020. The legislative package, known as the Clean Energy Future 
Package, includes a Carbon Price Mechanism (CPM) that was to take effect July 2012 
and link with international offset markets from July 2015.268 The scheme will cover 
approximately 500 businesses representing 60 percent of Australia greenhouse gas 
emissions from electricity generation.269 Under the scheme, participants can meet 50 
percent of their emissions obligation with international credits. Africa can take advantage 
of the scheme’s liberal linking provisions. 
China has also decided to launch a nationwide emissions trading scheme by 2015. As a 
form of testing the waters, it has launched seven pilot carbon-trading schemes in 
preparation for the take off of the nationwide emissions trading scheme in 2015.  
In November 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission ordered seven 
Chinese cities and provinces to set up pilot carbon trading systems during the 12th Five-
Year Plan, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, Chongqin, Shenzhen (the five cities) 
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and Guangdong and Hubei provinces.270 Given China’s emissions intensity, there will 
most likely be a provision for linking when the nationwide emissions trading scheme is 
launched in 2015. 
Japan is also planning to introduce a domestic emissions trading scheme, where there is 
currently a Basic Law on Climate Change Countermeasures, which contains a provision 
for the adoption of a domestic emissions trading scheme.271 Though it has not been 
approved yet, it will be approved once the highly political issues of tax reform and 
pension reform are settled. There will most likely be a provision for linking once the law 
is passed. 
It is also believed that if the new California cap and trade program succeeds, the US will 
have a national cap and trade program by 2016.272 The New Zealand ETS also allows for 
linking with international credits. 
Linking the proposed scheme to several ETS in other jurisdictions in a non-reciprocal 
manner can be a source of massive financial flows to Africa companies who cut their 
emissions beyond and above the allowances given to them.273  
A regional ETS can also fetch revenue for African countries through the auctioning of 
allowances to the highest bidder. This revenue can be used to fight the overwhelming 
challenges of climate change in Africa.  
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The challenges posed to Africa by climate change are considerable and there are no 
matching funds available. The Human Development Report 2007-2008 confirms that 
adaptation aid to Africa is flat. To date, the Least Developed Country Fund—one of the 
sources of adaptation funding under the UNFCCC—has received pledges from 17 donors 
amounting to just under US$157 million. Less than one-half of this has been delivered to 
Global Environment Facility accounts. Actual spending in terms of delivery through 
projects amounts to US$9.8 million.274 In total, $350 million has been pledged to Africa 
to support adaptation plan of actions. Out of the pledged sum, only $130 million has been 
delivered.275 Yet, World Bank adaptation cost studies suggest that Africa will need close 
to $30 billion between now and 2030 to effectively adapt to climate change.276 
As evident in Chapter One, the poorest countries of the world will be the hardest hit by 
the impact of climate change. According to the Stern Review, to stabilise the level of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at even 500 ppm CO2, a level that would still 
carry a significant risk of dangerous climate change, would cost around two percent of 
global GDP annually—close to US$1 trillion.277 The African Group of Negotiators has 
also argued that Africa will need at least US$267 billion a year for mitigation and 
adaptation.278  
The African Union has rightly identified finance as a major constraint, both to adaptation 
and mitigation actions in Africa. The approach of the African Union to the half-hearted 
commitment to climate change aid by developed countries is to demand compensation for 
Africa in the interest of climate justice at UNFCCC negotiations; that the North must pay 
the climate debt owed to the South.279 This approach is commendable, as developed 
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countries can do more than they are currently doing (as they are obligated under the 
principles of international environmental law).280 
The need is acute, but total reliance on foreign aid cannot solve the problem, especially in 
view of the economic downturn in developed economies. Other sources of funding 
should be explored. A regional ETS can help African countries attract additional funding 
to implement climate change programmes. 
CDM cannot ensure the transfer of wealth from developed countries to Africa in the 
manner a national and regional ETS with linkage to other ETS would achieve. Less than 
30 per cent of the revenue from CDM goes to developing countries. The rest goes to 
brokers, bankers, investors, and consultants in rich countries, as well as to fees and 
taxes.281 Most CDM finances are absorbed by project developers as transaction costs. 
A graphic example of this is the Trees Farm project in the Bukaleba Forestry Reserve in 
Uganda. The project is meant to offset the GHG emissions of a coal-fired power plant to 
be built in Norway. The Ugandan government received a meagre one-off fee of US$410 
and an annual rent of about US$410 for each hectare of plantation, which is an 
incongruously low lease price compared to the huge carbon credits the Norwegian 
company (Tree Farms) was aiming to sell.282 What is more, Certified Emission 
Reduction units (CERs) are sold at a discounted rate in the carbon market compared to 
the EUAs (European Union Emission Allowances). The designated carbon unit of the 
scheme will attract more value than CERs. 
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3.5 Contribution to the Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases 
in the Atmosphere 
An understanding of the contributions and trends of greenhouse gas emissions in Africa 
is important in knowing what mitigation strategy or policy to adopt. 
Africa’s contribution to the global pool of greenhouse gases is currently modest but like 
all other developing regions, its emissions are expected to increase in the future. There is 
an upward trend to Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions. Canadell et al. show that 
emissions from Africa have grown at a faster pace than the global average for the period 
2000-2005.283 In its Energy Outlook 2011, the US Energy Information Administration 
projects that Africa’s carbon dioxide related emissions will grow by 1.8 percent per year 
between 2008 and 2035.284  
According to US EPA,  
Non-CO2 emissions from Africa grew 17 percent between 1990 and 2005. 
GDP in Africa grew 57 percent over the same period. The pattern of 
emissions is quite different in Africa than other regions. Sources with 
significant emissions and growth over this period include savannah 
burning (included in other agricultural sources), biomass burning, natural 
gas and oil, stationary and mobile combustion, landfills and wastewater. 
Emissions from Africa are projected to increase 34 percent from 2005 to 
2030, while GDP is expected to triple over this time.285 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the global total non-CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2030, 
according to the US EPA. 
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Three variables influence emissions growth: population; income, measured as per capita 
gross domestic product; and intensity of emissions, (tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions 
per million dollars of GDP).286 Population x per capita GDP x Intensityghg =  Emissionsghg. 
 
Figure 3.1 Total Global Non-CO2 Emissions by Country Grouping 
Source: US EPA, Summary Report: Global Anthropogenic Non CO2 Emissions 1990-2030 (Office of 
Atmospheric Programs, Climate Change Division, Washington, DC, 2012). 
 
Figure 3.2 Percent Change in Total Global CO2 Emissions by Decade and Region 
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Source: US EPA, Summary Report: Global Anthropogenic Non CO2 Emissions 1990-2030 (Office of 
Atmospheric Programs, Climate Change Division, Washington, DC, 2012). 
 
The World Energy Council estimated that in the period 1980 to 2001, Africa’s energy 
intensity increased slightly between 1980 and 2001, from 5,953 Btu per $1995-PPP to 
6,555 Btu per $1995-PPP.287 Nigeria and South Africa accounted for the bulk of this 
increase, as they consume the bulk of the region’s energy and constitute the largest 
economies. African carbon dioxide intensity grew slightly; from 0.49 metric tonnes per 
thousand $1995-PPP to 0.51 metric tonnes per thousand $1995-PPP. Africa is the only 
world region where carbon dioxide intensity increased during this period.288 
Africa has the fastest population growth rate in the world.  Most of the high fertility 
countries are in Africa. Africa’s population was estimated to be 943 million in 2006.289 
According to the Population Reference Bureau, developed countries will experience little 
or no population growth in this century. The population growth expected in this century 
will come from the world’s poorest countries. By 2050, the population of the world’s 
LDCs will number over 8 billion, 86 percent of the world’s population.290 Appendix C 
shows the most populous countries in 2012 and 2050, and the countries with the highest 
fertility rates in 2012. 
According to the report, Nigeria will be the fourth largest country in the world by 2050. 
With only 10 percent landmass, this would mean increased pressure on the environment. 
The environment cannot keep up with the pace of this population growth. 
Africa also has the highest rate of urbanization in the world, ranging between 3-5 percent 
per year. In 2000, one in three Africans lived in cities; by 2030 one in two will live in 
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cities.291 Almost two thirds of all vehicle fleet growth will be in non-OECD countries.292 
This translates to increased emissions from the transport sector. 
Africa’s economic growth rate is expected be to 4.5 percent in 2013 and rising to 5 
percent by 2014.293 The economic prospects for the future look bright as well. This is due 
to increasing trade and investment ties with developing economies. The new oil 
discoveries in Africa mean that Africa’s GDP will increase. The new oil discoveries are 
in Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Uganda. These discoveries add to the ten existing 
major oil-exporting countries (Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria) in Africa.294 Ghana’s Jubilee field has an 
estimated total reserve of 490 million barrels of high quality oil and is expected to yield 
government revenues of $1 billion on average per year between 2011 and 2029, based on 
a long-run price assumption of $75 per barrel. Oil production had already started in 
Ghana in 2010.295 
The above statistics suggest that Africa is set to have a major influence on the global pool 
of greenhouse gases. Consequently, increased action on mitigation is needed. A 
piecemeal approach to mitigation will not suffice in the circumstance. A cap on emissions 
will do more environmentally than the current project-by-project nature mitigation under 
the CDM. A cap and trade program conceptually guarantees environmental certainty 
more than project-based trading. 
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The greenhouse gas emissions intensity of some countries in Africa is already significant. 
Africa’s environmental impact intensity in relation to the level of industrialisation is 
among the highest in the world.296 Algeria emitted a total of 117.3 million tonnes of 
greenhouse gases in the year 2000.  
The energy sector was responsible for about 75 percent of these emissions, with 20 
percent of that figure coming from the production, processing and transport of 
hydrocarbons, and 47 percent down to the electricity generation. Of total emissions, 
agriculture accounted for 11 percent, waste emitted 10 percent and industrial processes 5 
percent.297 In Egypt, total emissions for 2000 amounted to about 193 MtCO2. Fifty-five 
percent of the emissions came from fuel combustion, 6 percent from fugitive fuel 
emissions, 16 percent from agriculture, 14 percent from industrial processes and 9 
percent from the waste sector.298 
In 2000, the total greenhouse gas emissions from the five main sectors (energy, industry, 
agriculture, land use change and forestry, waste) in Nigeria were about 330,946 Gg 
CO2.299 
South Africa’s total emissions in 2000 were estimated to be 461 million tonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalents (CO2e) .300 Eighty-three percent of emissions are derived from 
energy supply and consumption, 7 percent from industrial processes, 8 percent from 
agriculture, and 2 percent from the waste sector. 
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An emissions trading scheme can help reduce Africa’s emissions. African fuels are 
known to be of poor quality and high in sulphur levels,301 a major contributor to global 
warming. A regional cap and trade scheme covering the downstream sector in Africa, for 
instance, will not only reduce emissions from the sector but also reduce emissions from 
the transport sector. Cleaner fuels will mean fewer emissions from the transport sector. 
This will also translate to better air quality in African cities. 
3.6 Preparing Africa for a Carbon Constrained Future 
The future of the world is likely going to be carbon constrained. The principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility (the main pillar of the UNFCCC) envisages a 
time when developing countries will also assume quantified emissions limitation 
obligation and reduction commitments (QELRCs). Not much progress has been made in 
the fight against climate change, even as greenhouse gases continue to rise in the 
atmosphere.302 A reason for this failure is because of the problem of burden sharing; how 
to allocate climate change control responsibility between developed country parties and 
developing country parties.303  
Since broad partnership is needed in the goal of stabilizing the concentration of 
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, a process has begun to devise fair solutions to all 
parties concerned. At the 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, parties 
agreed to speedily work toward a universal climate change agreement covering all 
countries from 2020, to be adopted by 2015. 
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The international negotiation to build a new global climate agreement and to drive greater 
immediate climate action has started. The negotiating team is looking at:  
an innovative set of ways for all countries to commit to climate actions 
that are compatible with their national circumstances; that the contours of 
the new agreement must integrate action across all levels (international, 
national, sub-national and private sector); and that a mechanism must be 
created to regularly ratchet up ambition to stay below a 2 degrees Celsius 
temperature rise.304 
An agreement that is compatible with national circumstance could mean quantified 
emissions limitation obligations based on per capita emissions. Implementing emissions 
trading as a policy before the agreement is reached can help institutions adjust early to 
new obligations of the UNFCCC, so that when African countries assume additional 
responsibility under the UNFCCC, meeting the obligations will not be so burdensome. 
Naturally, increased obligations for African countries would be demanding on the 
government as well as industries in Africa. Implementing emissions trading as a policy 
could make the transition to a carbon constrained environment less painful because, in 
principle, it seeks to reduce greenhouse gases emissions at the lowest cost to the society. 
The fact that emissions trading allows for trans boundary cost sharing will make the 
transition to a carbon constrained environment less difficult. 
3.7 Viability of the Policy in Africa 
The next issue to be considered is the issue of institutional feasibility. It is argued that the 
fundamental criterion for a policy to exist in the real world is that it must demonstrate or 
gain institutional feasibility.305 Feasibility consists of being publicly acceptable (political 
feasibility) and having administrative capacity available to implement it. Institutional 
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feasibility also includes factors such as plausibility and time requirements to develop or 
enable institutions to implement a policy.306 
The presence of multinationals with experience in emissions trading favours the 
implementation of an emissions trading scheme in Africa. Multinationals like Shell, 
ExxonMobil and Lafarge Cement have substantial experience in emissions trading.  
These multinationals are active participants in the emissions trading scheme in Europe. 
Before the introduction of the trading scheme in Europe, Royal Dutch/Shell launched its 
own internal emissions trading to learn the intricacies of emissions trading schemes. The 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group developed and used a pilot internal emissions trading system 
(STEPS) to gain experience and understanding in the use of, and structure for, emissions 
trading. The system, which ran from 2000 to 2002, allowed trading between Shell Group 
entities located in Annex 1 countries. The system covered over 33 million metric tonnes 
of CO2e from over 22 separate sites, accounting for almost two-thirds of its global 
emissions.307 The presence of these multinationals will ensure the policy’s smooth 
takeoff. Their experience will also rub off on the local African companies in the carbon 
intensive sectors of the economy who have no experience in emissions trading. 
For an active emissions market to emerge in Africa there must be enough pollution 
sources. There are enough polluting industries in Africa to make trading of permits 
possible. The polluting industries cut across various sectors of the economy with different 
marginal abatement cost to act as an incentive to trade. Appendix D shows some of the 
polluting sources in Africa. 
The fact that the polluting sources are not homogenous means there is room for a market 
to develop. The Moroccan industry alone burns 1 million tonnes of fossil fuels each year, 
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generating 2 million tonnes of CO2.308 The cement industries and fertilizer industries in 
Egypt are very energy intensive. They contribute about 28 Mt of CO2e per year, 
representing more than 99 percent of the total emissions of Egypt’s industrial sector.309   
The institutions in Africa have also been building capacity in carbon trading. Kenya 
opened the first carbon exchange in Africa in 2011.310 The goal of the exchange is to 
facilitate the trading of carbon credits generated through the Clean Development 
Mechanism. The exchange is called the African Carbon Exchange (ACX). It is based in 
Nairobi, Kenya. The ACX is an electronic trading platform for the trading of carbon 
credits and environmental derivatives. Since 2008, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange311 
has been using its platform to sell carbon credit notes. Carbon credit notes are listed 
tradable securities designed to provide holders with the opportunity to gain exposure to 
carbon credits that will be generated from greenhouse gas mitigation projects. There is 
another carbon trading platform in Zambia, called the African Carbon Credit 
Exchange.312 The South African government is also considering introducing an emissions 
trading scheme.313 
While an active homegrown carbon market can develop in Africa, some institutional 
barriers will have to be addressed. This will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Institutional Barriers Against a Homegrown Emissions 
Trading Scheme in Africa 
Conditions are hardly ever perfect for the introduction of a new policy. In this chapter, I 
will look at the institutional barriers that must be addressed before there can be a 
homegrown emissions trading scheme in Africa. Some of the barriers that will be 
discussed are challenges facing mitigation of climate change in Africa. This chapter will 
also proffer solutions to these institutional barriers. 
4.1 Greenhouse Gas Inventory Constraint 
An inventory of greenhouse gases is important in mitigation of climate change. 
 Developing a national inventory of greenhouse gases is part of the obligations of African 
countries to the UNFCCC.314 A national GHG inventory is a comprehensive listing, by 
source of annual GHG emissions.315 National inventories include greenhouse gas 
emissions and removals, taking place within national territory and offshore areas over 
which the country has jurisdiction.  A GHG inventory report should cover all the relevant 
gases and source categories of the gases. National GHG inventories provide a baseline of 
data and, if regularly updated, a tracking mechanism for assessing how domestic policies 
impact emissions.316 The guideline to follow in the emissions development process by 
parties to the Convention is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change guidelines. 
The basic approach for calculating emissions under the IPCC guidelines is summed in the 
equation: Emissions = Activity Data x Emissions Factor.317 
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Activity Level Data is the extent to which an activity that leads to emissions of GHG 
takes place, while Emissions Factor refers to the ratio between the emissions generated 
and the outputs of production processes. Fuel consumption would, for instance, constitute 
activity level data in the energy sector, while the mass of carbon dioxide emitted per unit 
of fuel consumed would constitute an emission factor.318 
One of the qualities of a good inventory is consistency. Estimates for different inventory 
years, gases and categories are made in such a way that differences in the results between 
years and categories reflect real differences in emissions.319 A good inventory must also 
be accurate, must not contain underestimates,320 and must be complete. Estimates are 
reported for all relevant categories of sources and sinks, and gases.321 
Inventory preparation has proven to be a challenge for African countries, as there is so 
much uncertainty in the process. The authors and compilers of South Africa’s GHG 
Inventory (1990 to 2000) said: 
The GHG inventory process continues to face a number of challenges, the 
most significant of which is the availability of activity data for 
computation of the emissions. The most challenging sectors for data 
collection were AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use) and 
IPPU (Industrial Processes and other Product Use). For the AFOLU sector, 
spatial data, in-depth research and modelling studies are required in order 
to create a robust database for land use and land use changes. Data for the 
agriculture sector had to be obtained from international sources (FAO) for 
this 2000 inventory. For the IPPU sector, one reason given for the 
difficulty in collecting data was lack of cooperation by some industrial 
companies connected to the protection of confidentiality. There is an 
urgent need for government assistance here. Government can consolidate 
the agreements it has entered into with industry so that industry provides 
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the required data, and in a format that is commensurate with the data 
requirements for preparations of national GHG inventories.322 
 
Challenges facing African countries in inventory preparation include incomplete or non- 
existent activity data, lack of country specific emission factors, and difficulty in retaining 
experts. The west African countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Chad, and Togo have identified 
several difficulties in inventory preparation; including inconsistencies and lack of 
coherence in data provided by sources, lack of forest surveys, limited national coverage 
in some data items, and predominance of informal (unregulated) sectors. 
In east African Ethiopia, 
Even though Ethiopian environmental policy states that there should be a 
policy to ‘promote a climate monitoring program as a country is highly 
sensitive to climate vulnerability’, there are two problems with this law: 
first, it doesn’t give the responsibility to any single agency but the 
National Metrological Agency is doing it. Second, it only refers to 
vulnerability data and looks at how Ethiopia is affected by the world with 
GHG emissions rather than looking at domestic GHG emissions. 
Industries, sectors and government agencies don’t have any mandate to 
collect data or have ownership of data. Government agencies and sub-
national administration also don’t have any government mandate to 
monitor GHG by industries. As these agencies don’t have any 
governmental mandate or authority, they face challenges in collecting data 
from industries. Furthermore, without any mandate, allocation of resources 
including financial and personnel by the government agency to monitor 
GHG emission won’t be possible. There is an absence of locally applicable 
data collection tools and methodology. Even though IPCC guideline 
should be used to collect data, some of the tools and methodologies need 
to be locally adapted so that it can properly reflect the local environment. 
National, sub-national and government agencies, which should be 
monitoring GHG emissions, don’t have the necessary technological 
infrastructure collect and store data. Financial constraint is also one of the 
challenges that agencies have in creating data collection mechanisms and 
maintaining the system. As the government currently doesn’t have the 
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policy to monitor GHG emission, it doesn’t allocate any budget to set up 
and maintain the necessary system.323 
 
The lack of activity data is because priority is not given to environmental accounting in 
African countries, and also due to poor data management. Low quality inventory is not 
peculiar to African countries alone; it is a general phenomenon common to all developing 
country parties’ inventory under the UNFCCC.324 
A good inventory is very important to an emissions trading scheme because it is from the 
inventory that a decision will be made about which sectors to include, and where to apply 
the obligation to hold allowances (e.g., at the fuel distributor or the emission source).  It 
is also from the inventory that a decision will be made about the aggregate cap. In 
addition, emissions inventory is sometimes used to project future emissions.325 
The minimum data requirements for the emission inventory necessary for a tradable 
permit scheme include individual emission source characteristics (e.g., size, location, 
name-plate capacity, process type, boiler type, fuel type) and emission levels for 
individual sources based on output, fuel use, and/or emission data.326 
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Some polluting companies in Africa voluntarily report their emissions. For instance, in its 
annual sustainability report, Shell publishes its greenhouse gas emissions.327 Some 
polluting companies in Africa are involved in the Carbon Disclosure Project.328 
Companies like Eskom, Transnet, Sasol, Anglo American PLC, Barloworld, FirstRand 
Ltd., Gold Fields Ltd., Mondi PLC, and Woolworths are active participants in the Carbon 
Disclosure Project.329 However, the problem with voluntary reporting by companies is 
the risk of underreporting. For instance, in its Sustainability Report 2012, Shell did not 
provide emission data on specific locations and facilities. The level of reporting of gas 
flaring of other oil companies in Nigeria is also not up to the standard required.330 
To solve this challenge, there should be a legislative framework for greenhouse gas 
reporting in African countries. Regulation should require reporting of GHG emissions at 
the facility level and then roll up to the corporate level. Companies should state GHG 
emission source categories such as from stationary combustion mobile construction, 
process emission, and fugitive emissions. African countries whose emissions primarily 
emanate from the forestry sector should mandate farmers and other forest-dependent 
professions to report their activity-based emissions. This would involve training in the 
reporting guidelines of the IPCC. 
To this end, the Department of Environmental Affairs in South Africa is contemplating 
making emissions reporting mandatory for all entities (companies and installations) that 
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emit more than 0.1 Mt of GHGs annually, or that consume electricity that results in more 
than 0.1 Mt of emissions from the electricity sector. Qualifying entities will be obliged to 
report energy use by energy carrier and other data, as may be prescribed. The emissions 
inventory will be a web-based GHG Emission Reporting System.331 The fact that it is a 
web-based system will make for more transparent reporting. 
Through its Consultative Group of Experts on National Communication, the Conference 
of Parties has also been organising training workshops to improve the inventory 
preparation process in Africa, one of which was recently organised in Namibia for 
African experts involved in the inventory preparation process.332 
This is important because, even if there is a legislative framework for emissions reporting 
in Africa, there is need for well-trained experts who would be able to evaluate and ensure 
that the reporting format followed the IPCC standards for GHG reporting.  
4.2 Monitoring and Enforcement Constraint 
This constraint is closely intertwined with the earlier constraint discussed in this chapter. 
The goal of any tradable permit scheme is to control pollution, albeit through cost 
effective means. This goal can only be achieved if the environmental goals of the 
program are strictly adhered to. This can only be done through an effective enforcement 
regime, but African countries have weak environmental enforcement capacity.  
For instance, in Nigeria, it was recently reported that, in 2012, none of the oil firms in 
Nigeria paid the new gas flare penalty of $3.50 per standard cubic foot because they 
disagreed with the penalty. The Department of Petroleum Resources, charged with the 
task of enforcing the flare penalty, failed to enforce the penalty on oil companies.333 This 
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weak enforcement capacity is partly due to the fact that environmental protection is yet to 
assume the importance it deserves in the public space. 
Enforcement of emissions trading generally involves four steps: detecting violation, 
notifying the source, negotiating a compliance schedule, and applying sanctions for non-
compliance when appropriate.334 Detecting violation involves determining that a plant is 
in compliance when it commences operation, and during continuous normal operation.335 
Normally, a single set of tests, conducted at installation, will suffice to determine that a 
source is initially in compliance, but it is inherently harder to verify continuous 
compliance. Several means are used to detect violations, including self-certification by 
sources,
336
 on-site inspections, and direct monitoring of pollutant flows. Thus, the ability 
to measure emissions by participating facilities is very important in an ETS. 
Measuring compliance can be difficult for GHGs.  Carbon dioxide is easier to monitor 
because of the close link between the carbon content of fuel and the amount of carbon 
dioxide emissions. Thus, monitoring the flow of fuels could substitute for monitoring 
emissions.337  
However, monitoring methane is difficult. Agricultural sources of methane, such as 
ruminant animals and animal wastes, sources of nitrous oxide and carbon sinks, are also 
difficult to monitor accurately.338 
One way of dealing with unreliable emissions monitoring would be to limit trading to 
GHG sources that can be readily and accurately monitored.339 For gases that are difficult 
to monitor, such as methane, emission factors may be developed.340 
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Determining compliance in emissions trading involves comparing actual emissions with 
authorized emissions. If actual emissions are estimated imperfectly, the environmental 
goal of the ETS is diminished. The two known options for showing compliance are 
through modeling and monitoring. However, modeling does not guarantee continuous 
compliance because it is an estimate accomplished before the fact.341 Technology could 
help solve this monitoring concern; for instance, asking facilities to install and pay for a 
Continuous Emissions Monitor (CEM). A CEM would make it easier to verify 
continuous compliance.342 A CEM would also transfer the monitoring burden to 
polluters, especially in a terrain where the environmental enforcement capacity is weak. 
Another way of dealing with monitoring concerns is to use permits in some markets and 
to combine permits and standards in others.343 As part of compliance, facilities or firms 
must show that monitored emissions match allowances.  
The allowance monitoring system should be sufficiently harmonized with the emissions 
monitoring system to allow matches between the two to be easily obtained. A registry is 
needed to ensure this. The registry is an automated database that keeps track of all 
permits and changes to the permits either through transfer or use.344 
4.3 Corruption 
Another institutional constraint is corruption. For an emissions trading scheme to 
succeed, the regulator must be corruption-free; the participants in an emissions trading 
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scheme must have confidence in the regulator. Emissions trading will thrive in an 
environment where rule of law is respected and enforcement is consistent, impartial, 
transparent, and independent of political considerations. Participating firms or facilities 
should clearly understand from the onset how the program works, and how regulating 
authorities will measure and enforce compliance. Interest in a trading program will 
diminish significantly if firms believe that rules are unfair, arbitrary, or unpredictable.345 
The role of the ministry of environment, or agencies charged with environmental 
protection, is crucial because it is the ministry or agency that will monitor and enforce the 
scheme locally. While corruption is a global vice, it appears more predominant in Africa. 
Ninety percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa scored below 50 (the average score) in 
the Corruption Perception Index 2012 of Transparency International.346 
This perception is capable of eroding the confidence of participants in the process, but it 
can, however, be remedied if public participation in environmental governance is 
allowed. Public inputs on what the emissions cap should be and public access to data on 
trades, violations and actual emissions will enhance the credibility of the program. 
Evaluation of compliance by rights groups should be factored into the implementation 
design. Rights groups can exert a lot of pressure on companies that want to dilute the 
emissions goal and on impartial regulators.  
4.4 Summary Conclusions 
Despite the aforementioned institutional barriers, emissions trading can thrive in Africa. 
The literature on emissions trading schemes reveals that conditions must not necessarily 
be ripe for trading before the policy is deployed.  Chile has already experimented with 
tradable permits for total suspended particulates. Montero et al. found that the allocation 
process associated with a tradable permit scheme created, “economic incentives for 
incumbent sources to more readily declare their emissions and claim the corresponding 
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emissions rights (i.e., capture scarcity rents), helping the authority complete its inventory 
of sources and emissions more quickly”.347 
Setting up an emissions trading scheme is always challenging; it proved challenging for 
the developed countries as well. According to Ellerman, 
The problems that are likely to be encountered in setting up a cap-and-
trade system should not be minimized. Institutionally, the Member States 
of the European Union must be considered more prepared and capable of 
implementing such a system than many of the prospective participants in a 
global system. Yet, there was no end of difficulties in setting up the 
system in Europe. The biggest problem was data at the installation level 
which was needed both for the allocation of allowances to covered 
installations and more importantly for setting an appropriate cap. The data 
deficiencies in Eastern Europe were greater than they were for the EU15 
and most of the East European governments required more time to set up 
the requisite infrastructure for trading and enforcement. Poland’s registry 
did not go on line until eighteen months after the start of the EU ETS; and 
Romania and Bulgaria, who became participants in the trial period in its 
last year, did not have everything in place in time to participate effectively 
in trading in 2007.348 
 Another challenge that the EU ETS faced is corruption. So, how did EU overcome all the 
challenges associated with setting up a tradable permit scheme? What lessons can Africa 
learn from existing successful tradable permit schemes? This will be the focus of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Emissions Trading Scheme Success Stories 
There have been several experiments with tradable permit schemes, both in developed 
and in developing countries. Tradable permit schemes have been deployed to address 
climate change and conventional pollution control. This chapter will examine the United 
States Acid Rain Program, the EU ETS, the New Zealand ETS, and the tradable permit 
scheme in Chile. 
5.1 The United States Acid Rain Program 
The Acid Rain emissions allowance trading program was enacted through Title IV of the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).349  In 1980, prior to the enactment of the 
Amendment and due to public concern about acid rain, the US Congress commissioned a 
ten year study of the causes and effects of acid rain. The result of the study led to the 
introduction of emissions trading under the Clean Air Act.350 The goal of the program 
was to achieve a 10 million-tonne annual reduction in sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
from 1980 levels by the year 2010, and a 2 million tonne annual reduction in nitrogen 
oxide (N2O) emissions, also below 1980 levels.351 Phase 1 of the program, which began 
in 1995, included mostly coal-burning electric utility plants located in 21 eastern and 
midwestern states. Phase II of the program, which began in 2000, tightened the annual 
emissions limits imposed on large, higher-emitting plants and also set restrictions on 
smaller, cleaner plants fired by coal, oil, and gas.352  
Utilities have the freedom in meeting their compliance obligations. They could decide to 
employ energy conservation measures (i.e. increasing reliance on renewable energy and 
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reducing usage), or adopt pollution control technologies like switching to lower sulphur 
fuels.353 Utilities that reduce their emissions below the number of allowances they hold 
may trade with other utilities or bank them to cover emissions in future years.354 
Each allowance is defined for a specific calendar year. They are transferable among the 
affected sources; any plants reducing emissions more than required by the allowances 
could transfer the unused allowances to other plants. 
 A source must hold enough allowances to equal its emissions in a calendar year. If a 
source emits 8,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide in a year, it must hold 8,000 allowances in 
that same year. Emissions cannot exceed the levels permitted by the allowances, whether 
acquired or allocated. Utilities are required to pay a penalty per tonne if they emit more 
than their authorized holdings. This penalty was $2,000 per tonne in 1990 and is indexed 
to inflation.355 Secondly, excess tonnes in one year are subtracted from the allocation the 
following year. The penalty of $2,000 per excess tonne was effective in ensuring 
compliance because it was greater than the cost of buying an allowance.356 If the penalty 
is not greater than the cost of an allowance, there will be a lot of violations by firms. 
The US Environmental Protection Agency allocated allowances at an emission rate of 2.5 
pounds of SO2/mmBtu (million British thermal units) of heat input, multiplied by the 
unit's baseline mmBtu (the average fossil fuel consumed from 1985 through 1987).357 
These allowance allocations are listed in Table A of the Clean Air Act and codified in the 
Allowance System Regulations (Part 73, Table 1). Alternative or additional allowance 
allocations were made for various units, including affected units in Illinois, Indiana, and 
Ohio, which were allocated a pro rata share of 200,000 additional allowances each year 
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between 1995 and 1999.358 In the second phase, allowance calculations were made for 
various types of units, such as coal- and gas-fired units with low and high emissions rates 
or low fuel consumption. The EPA allocated allowances to each unit at an emission rate 
of 1.2 pounds of SO2/mmBtu of heat input, multiplied by the unit's baseline.359 
Beginning in 2010, the Act places a cap at 8.95 million on the number of allowances 
issued to units each year. This caps emissions at 8.95 million tonnes annually and ensures 
that the mandated emissions reductions are maintained over time.360 
In addition to annual allocations, allowances could also be obtained by application to the 
US EPA reserves. Utilities were allowed to obtain additional allowances in Phase 1 by 
installing qualifying Phase I technology (a technology that can be demonstrated to 
remove at least 90 percent of the unit's SO2 emissions) or by reassigning their reduction 
requirements among other units employing such technology.361 A second reserve 
provides allowances as incentives for units achieving SO2 emissions reductions through 
customer-oriented conservation measures or renewable energy generation. Sources were 
required to submit information regarding their energy savings and renewable generation 
to the EPA. In turn, the EPA awarded allowances at a pre-determined rate of one 
allowance per 500 megawatt hours of energy saved or renewable energy generated.362 
The third reserve contains allowances set aside for auction, which are sponsored yearly 
by EPA. Utilities that began operating in 1996 or later were not allocated allowances. 
They are meant to purchase allowances from the market.363 
To ensure compliance with the cap set, utilities must install Continuous Emissions 
Monitors (CEMs) to accurately monitor their actual emissions. Each utility must show 
that it holds at least as many allowances for its emissions that year as measured by its 
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installed CEM. Sources must finalise allowance transactions and submit them to the EPA 
by March 1st (or by February 29th if it is a leap year) so that they can be recorded in their 
compliance account.364 The EPA also has an auditing team; the audit is meant to verify 
that the testing is completed according to standard procedures and accurately represented 
in the reports to EPA.365 The auditing team performs both random and targeted field 
audits. They visit facilities to inspect the CEM and the on-site records to verify that data 
reported to the EPA are actually a reflection of what is going on at the facilities.366 
One of the innovations of this program was the creation of an auction market. The 
auction market helped in achieving the low cost compliance objective of the program. 
Previous emissions trading markets did not work well because of high transaction costs. 
This was due to the fact that allowances could only be purchased through private sale. 
Prices of allowances were confidential because the sale was private and there was scarce 
information about potential buyers and sellers of emissions.367 Though the auction 
market was meant to reduce transaction costs, it could ostensibly raise the cost of 
compliance significantly.  
The US EPA established a zero revenue auction to solve this problem. Each year, the 
EPA withholds from its allocation to utilities less than 3 percent of the allocated 
allowances and auctions them off. These allowances are allocated to the highest bidders, 
with the successful buyers paying the actual bid price. Proceeds are refunded on a 
proportional basis to the utilities from which the allowances were withheld.368 Private 
allowance holders other than utilities can also sell at the auction market.369 
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Another innovation of this program is that it allows anyone to purchase allowances. Thus, 
environmental groups and private citizens can purchase allowances for the purpose of 
retiring them.370 Any retired allowance can no longer be used to emit pollution. 
Environmental and student groups acquired up to 934 allowances between 1994-1997.371 
Any person or group—including brokers and investors—wishing to purchase allowances 
may open a general Allowance Management System (AMS) account. AMS accounts 
track issuance of all allowances, how many allowances an account holds, how many 
allowances are held in various allowance reserves such as the EPA Auction Reserve and 
the Conservation and Renewable Energy Reserve, deduction of allowances for 
compliance purposes, and transfer of allowances between accounts. Information on 
emissions allowances and transactions is available to the public.372 
The Program is regarded to be a success. It is said to have reduced emissions by thirty-
five percent more than the pre-existing command-and-control emissions cap, with a cost 
savings of twenty-five to thirty-five percent (about $225-375 million) each year.373 Data 
from 1988 show that ambient SO2 concentrations in the air are declining.374 Field data 
collected by the National Atmospheric Deposition Program/National Trends Network 
(NADP/NTN) also reveal that sulphate levels in precipitation have dropped sharply since 
the SO2 Emissions Trading Program began in 1995.375 According to the Clean Air and 
Status and Trends Network (CASTNET), dry deposition sulphur concentration levels 
have also declined by approximately 30 percent in the northeast and Mid-Atlantic 
States.376 A study examining surface water quality in the acid sensitive regions of the 
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United States found that sulphur concentrations in lakes and streams have declined 
significantly in all monitored regions of the Eastern United States, except Virginia. 
Nitrate concentrations have decreased significantly in the Catskill and Adirondack 
Mountains, and in Vermont since 1990.377  
According to the EPA, the program has led to 67 percent annual SO2 emissions compared 
to 1980 levels, and 64 percent compared to 1990 levels.378 In 2009, sources involved in 
the program emitted 5.7 million tonnes of SO2, well below the 9.5 million tonne cap for 
the year.379 The 3,572 electricity-generating units involved in the program in 2009 
complied with the requirement to hold enough allowances to cover their SO2 
emissions.380 
N2O emissions were 2.0 million tonnes in 2009, well below the projected number of 8.1 
million tonnes. Though other factors such as low demand for electricity contributed to 
reduction in N2O emissions, the program was largely responsible for the reduction.381 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the reduction in SO2 and N2O emissions. 
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Figure 5.1 SO2 Emissions from Acid Rain Program Sources, 1980-2009 
Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain and Other Programs: 2009 Highlights 
(Clean Air Market Division: Washington, DC, 2010) at 3. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 N2O Emission Trends for All Acid Rain Program Units, 1990-2009 
Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain and Other Programs: 2009 Highlights 
(Clean Air Market Division: Washington, DC, 2010) at 3. 
The EPA posits that the program has also fostered innovation, because sulphur removal 
technology has become radically more effective and less expensive during the life of the 
program.382 
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5.2 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the US Acid Rain 
Program 
Emissions trading does not work in vacuum; it must be complemented by other policy 
initiatives. The success of the Acid Rain Program was due to the sulphur dioxide 
regulation, which specified National Ambient Air Quality Standards.383 Thus, there must 
be a strong regulatory framework for pollution control in place before emissions trading 
can work. This will give sources the opportunity to choose how they intend to meet 
environmental goals. Sources that prefer a tradable permit scheme can opt for it, while 
sources that prefer standard setting can opt for that instead. This flexibility in choice can 
also help address institutional feasibility concerns that come with tradable permit 
schemes. 
Public participation is very important if a tradable permit scheme is to achieve success. 
Emissions trading is generally viewed with skepticism by the human rights community. 
The Institute of Security Studies in South Africa specifically called for the abolition of 
the CDM.384 Allowing inputs from the human rights community will allay some of their 
fears about carbon trading. Under the Acid Rain Program, the US EPA initiated a 
stakeholder process to solicit input on the implementation and experience with the 
emissions measurement requirements of the program.385The process involved regulated 
power plants under the program, the state and local environmental agencies that carry out 
audits for the EPA, and rights groups interested in the integrity of the program. The EPA 
used the input from the stakeholder process to revise the emission measurement 
requirements of the program.386 
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Emissions trading can help a country like South Africa transform the carbon intensive 
nature of its energy production. The feature of the Acid Rain Program that encourages 
energy conservation and renewable energy generation appears suitable for such a country.  
A country like Nigeria can use it to combat acid rain, which has been prevalent in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria due to gas flaring.387 Acid rain also occurs regularly in the 
Eastern Transvaal Highveld, the industrial hub of South Africa, where it can average a 
pH of 4.2.388 Industrial activity is the cause of acid rain in both Nigeria and South Africa. 
This makes emissions trading a suitable policy option. 
The opt-in provision in the Acid Rain Program can be used by African countries to 
ensure that there are enough participating sources in the scheme. This will encourage 
unregulated sources that want to cut their emissions to be involved in the program. 
Another feature of the Acid Rain Program that can be copied by African countries is the 
provision that specifies that allowances are not property rights.389 This is important in 
case a decision is made to alter the emissions cap, and will avoid a litigation backlash if 
such a decision is made. 
5.3 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
On 1 January 2005, the largest emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) came into existence. 
Like the Acid Rain Program, it came about via legislation390 proposed by the European 
Commission and approved by the EU member states and European parliament. The EU 
decided to implement a tradable permit system when its carbon tax proposal was rejected 
by businesses in the EU, and it became apparent that it would be difficult to meet its 
obligation to reduce its GHG emissions by 8 percent (below 1990 levels) by 2012 under 
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the Kyoto Protocol.391 The program is a cap and trade program. Participation is 
mandatory for companies in the sectors covered. The market is EU wide, but it also 
accepts credits from emission reduction projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The program covers some 
11,500 facilities owned by 5,000 companies in 31 countries.392 
Companies have several options in meeting their obligations; they could invest in more 
efficient technology, use a less carbon intensive source, or buy EU allowances and/or 
CDM/JI credits.  
Like the Acid Rain Program, the EU ETS is being implemented in phases. Phase 1 ran 
from January 2005 to December 2007. This phase was meant to allow EU countries and 
businesses to gain practical experience in emissions trading. EU countries, apart from the 
United Kingdom and Denmark,393 were inexperienced in emissions trading. Thus, it was 
necessary to develop the institutional capacity that would make emissions trading thrive.  
According to Ellerman et al., this phase was meant, “to establish the infrastructure and 
institutions and to gain the experience to make the subsequent ‘real’ periods a success, as 
opposed to achieving significant emissions reductions”.394 
The pilot phase was focused on CO2 and it covered all facilities with a thermal output of 
25 megawatts. The iron and steel sector, energy production, mineral industries, and paper 
and pulp production were the sectors covered in the pilot phase.395 The overall cap was 
made up of individual country caps set by each nation’s National Allocation Plan 
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(NAP).396 The NAP is meant to detail a member state emission target for ETS and non-
ETS sectors, and how a member state will allocate its allowances.397 The decentralised 
nature of the EU ETS meant that each member state had its own cap and trade while still 
being linked with one another.398 
Ninety-five percent of allowances in the first phase were allocated for free or 
grandfathered.399 The allocation process in the first phase was not without some tension. 
There was over-allocation of allowances during this phase, especially in the accession 
countries of the EU.400 
The pilot phase successfully established a price for carbon and free trade in emission 
allowances across the EU.401 The verified emission reports for the first year of the 
program became the benchmark by which the European Commission judged the 
acceptability of proposed caps for the second phase. The verified annual emission report 
filled the data gap that was present when the program came into existence. 
The second phase of the program (2008-2012) was used by EU member states to meet 
their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Ninety percent of the allowances in the 
second phase (first commitment period) were allocated for free.402 Two EU countries—
Bulgaria and Romania—and three non-EU countries—Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein—joined the scheme in the second phase. GHGs covered in the scheme 
extended to nitrous oxide emissions from the production of nitric acid.403 Phase III of the 
program started in January 2013. The cap for 2013 has been set at 2,039,152,882 EUAs. 
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The aviation sector has been included in this phase; it represents the largest emitting 
sector covered by the scheme. All airlines from all nationalities will need EUAs (EU 
allowances) to cover the emissions from their flights to, from, or within the EU.404 The 
new phase includes installations undertaking the capture, transport, and geological 
storage of greenhouse gases (CO2 emissions from the petrochemicals, ammonia and 
aluminum sectors, nitrous oxide emissions from the production of adipic acid and 
gloxylic acid, and perflourocarbon emissions from aluminum production).405 
Individuals and non-government organisations are free to buy and sell allowances in the 
market.406 Governments involved in the program are at liberty to exclude small 
installations from the program, so long as they have measures in place that will achieve 
an equivalent reduction in emissions. The revision to the program is expected to result in 
an emissions reduction of 120-130 million tonnes of CO2 per year.407 The program 
currently covers around 45 percent of EU emissions.408 It only focuses on sectors in 
which emissions can be measured, reported, and verified with a high level of accuracy. 
This is meant to minimise the MRV problems that can arise from adopting emissions 
trading as a climate policy instrument. 
The decentralised nature of the program will give way to a centralised approach. The 27 
national caps under the NAPs will give way to a single, EU-wide cap. It is believed that 
this centralised approach will enable the EU to achieve its emission reduction goals for 
2020.409 It is projected that the number of allowances that will be available in 2020 will 
be 21 percent below the level of the verified emissions in 2005.410 
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From 2013, 80 percent of the allowances in the manufacturing will be distributed for free 
while the rest will be auctioned. The number of allowances distributed free will reduce 
annually to 30 percent by 2020. In the aviation sector, 15 percent of the allowances 
would be auctioned for the period 2013- 2020.411 Installations of a given type will now 
be treated equally across the EU. The method of distributing allowances to the 
manufacturing sector is now based on harmonised rules. This is different from what was 
obtainable in the second phase, when member states were at liberty to distribute 
allowances the way they deemed fit.412 
All allowances in the power sector will be auctioned. The idea is that power companies 
can easily pass the cost of the allowances to consumers, unlike other sectors.413 However, 
countries like Cyprus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
and Romania will continue to distribute a certain percentage of allowances for free until 
2019. The power industries in these countries are meant to reciprocate the gesture by 
investing in the modernisation of the sector.414 Installations undertaking the capture, 
transport, and geological storage of greenhouse gases will also have to buy their 
allowances.415 
Auctions are held by companies appointed by national governments, but are open to 
buyers from any country participating in the EU ETS. Most governments use a common 
‘platform’ for their auctions, but Germany, Poland, and the UK have opted to use their 
own platforms. It is estimated that auctioning will generate 20-30 billion euros per year 
by 2020. Governments have agreed that the revenue generated from the auctions will be 
used to combat climate change in Europe and in developing countries.416 
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As part of compliance, businesses must monitor and report their EU ETS emissions for 
each calendar year and have their emission reports checked by an accredited verifier.417 
A calculation-based approach (using emission factors), as well as a CEM system, is 
allowed for monitoring and reporting emissions. Each installation involved in the 
program must have a permit418 from its competent authority for its emissions of all 
greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol. The operator of any installation must 
satisfy the competent authority that it is capable of monitoring and reporting its 
emissions.   
Operators whose emission reports for the year are adjudged as unsatisfactory by the 
independent verifier would not be allowed to sell allowances until a revised report is 
approved.419 Aircraft operators within the EU must have a monitoring plan. A new 
monitoring and reporting guidelines is now in effect; this is meant to check the noticeable 
divergence in member states’ monitoring, reporting, and verification practices.420 
Companies must surrender enough allowances to cover their total emissions by April 30th 
of the following year. These allowances are then cancelled so they cannot be used again. 
A company is penalised if it does not surrender enough allowances to cover its emissions. 
They will have to obtain additional allowances in the following year to make up for the 
shortfall.  
The defaulting company’s name will also be published;421 this is meant to embarrass the 
company. In addition to the above, the defaulting company will pay a fine for each excess 
tonne of CO2 emitted. The fine, initially set at 40 euros per tonne, is now 100 euros per 
tonne. The fine will continue to rise in line with the annual rate of inflation in the 
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Eurozone.422 Some member states also have additional dissuasive sanctions for any 
infringement of the program rules.423 
A single EU registry with strong security measures ensures the accurate accounting of 
allowances. The registry keeps track of the ownership of allowances held in electronic 
accounts. Trading can be done directly between buyers and sellers, through several 
organised exchanges, or through the many intermediaries active in the carbon market. In 
2011, some six billion allowances were traded, worth a total value of 77 billion euros.424 
Most accounts suggest the program is a success story. Ellerman and Buchner tentatively 
estimate that, in both 2005 and 2006, the EU ETS abated 85 million metric tonnes, or 4 
percent, of annual emissions.425 According to Grubb et al., the program has achieved a 
2.5 to 5 percent reduction in emissions below baseline levels.426 In April 2012, the 
European Commission published 2011 verified emissions data. Emissions fell from 1,938 
Mt in 2010 to 1,896 Mt in 2011, representing a 2.2 percent decline.427 Extraneous factors 
such as the economic crisis contributed to this reduction. Following the 2008 financial 
crisis, Europe entered into a recession and industrial activity fell strongly. European 
emissions from the industrial sector decreased drastically, generating an oversupply of 
allowances.428 The surplus in allowances could undermine the ability of the scheme to 
achieve more demanding emissions reductions in a cost effective manner.429 The EU 
would need an average annual 4.3 percent growth in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
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from 2013 to cancel out the excess.430 The European Commission wants to postpone the 
auctioning of allowances until late in the third trading period as a way of addressing the 
glut.431 The European Parliament is currently considering a proposal to withhold 900 
million permits from the market between 2013 and 2015, known as “backloading”.432 
There has also been suggestion of setting a price ceiling and floor to address the 
oversupply in the scheme.433 
In addition, a stringent cap has been proposed as a way of getting out of the problem, 
because rendering the program more stringent will increase allowance prices.434 
Emissions reductions are still being met despite the current low price of allowances.435 
All in all, the evidence suggests that the EU ETS has succeeded in reducing emissions 
below what would be expected from the recession alone.436 See Figure 5.3. 
                                                 
430
 EU ETS Fact Sheet supra note 373 at 5. 
431
 State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012 supra note 2 at 25. 
432
 EU ETS Fact Sheet supra note 373 at 6. 
433
 Mat Hope, Saving the EU Emissions Trading Scheme may mean abandoning key principles (Carbon 
Brief Blog, March 2013), online: <http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2013/03/saving-the-eu-emissions-
trading-scheme-may-mean-abandoning-key-principles>. 
434
 Robert Stavins, Low Prices a Problem? Making Sense of Misleading Talk about Cap and Trade in 
Europe and the USA (Robert Stavins’ Blog, 25 April 2012), online: 
<http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2012/04/25/low-prices-a-problem-making-sense-of-misleading-talk-
about-cap-and-trade-in-europe-and-the-usa/>. 
435
 Ibid. 
436
 See Brown, Hannafi & Petsnok, EU Emissions Trading System Results and Lessons Learned 
(Environmental Defense Fund 2012) for more information. 
113 
 
 
Figure 5.3 EU Emissions Data 
Source: Brown, Hannafi & Petsnok, EU Emissions Trading System Results and Lessons Learned 
(Environmental Defense Fund 2012). 
 
Apart from price concerns, the EU ETS have had to contend with fraudsters. In 2010, the 
European authorities uncovered several cases of  “carousel fraud”, which amounted to an 
estimated US$6.45 billion in lost revenues across at least 11 countries.437 Carousel fraud is a 
form of missing trader fraud, wherein the trader facilitating the carbon credit exchange keeps 
the value-added tax (VAT), rather than paying it to the tax authorities and government 
treasuries.438 Emission credits were initially purchased without adding the VAT, but then 
sold with the VAT added. This prompted changes in the tax law in EU countries that the 
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VAT fraud occurred.439 In 2011, due to lax security, three million units were stolen from 
national registries involved in the EU ETS. The fraudsters used classic cyber-criminality 
techniques to access accounts in several national registries and to transfer allowances.440 
To prevent further attacks, the European Commission suspended all registries on 19 
January 2011. The registries were reopened after each registry provided sufficient 
evidence that it met minimum-security criteria. The EU also wants to fully decouple its 
registry operations from the National Registries established under the Kyoto Protocol and 
centralize technical management in a Union Registry (UR), built as a single infrastructure 
and operated by single software as an additional measure to check this.441 
 
5.4 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
The cap is very important in a cap and trade program. The environmental integrity of the 
cap is dependent on the stringency of the cap. Usually, in a new program, the cap is 
moderate, but becomes more stringent over time. The cap can also be used to address the 
low price of allowance. If the price is too low, it will not act as an incentive to 
participants.442 The price must not be too low or too high, so that trading can occur. The 
cap and trade model appears suitable for countries like Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, and 
Nigeria, whose emissions are already significant and might likely resemble those of a 
developed country under a “business as usual” scenario in a few years’ time.  
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To build the necessary institutional capacity for emissions trading, African countries can 
copy the pilot phase of the EU ETS. The transition phase can be used to set up registry 
and the necessary enforcement regime of the policy. 
African countries can also copy the feature of the program that requires installation to 
have permits for its emissions. This will ensure that emitting installations or facilities 
build the capacity to monitor and report their emissions. The permit requirement would 
be part of the approval process for a new emitting installation or facility. 
The EU ETS shows the importance of mainstreaming corruption into climate change 
governance. The registry is very important in a tradable permit scheme; the integrity of 
the registry must be maintained at all times. Linking the registry of the proposed scheme 
to the International Transaction Log established under the Kyoto Protocol can help check 
possible phishing attacks on the registry. 
5.5 The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
The New Zealand ETS came into existence via the Climate Change Response Act.443 The 
ETS is New Zealand’s primary way of meeting its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.  
New Zealand’s per capita emissions are the twelfth highest in the world and its gross 
emissions keep rising due to increasing emissions in transportation and electricity 
generation.444 After some initial discussion about carbon tax, the New Zealand 
government decided to set up an ETS.445 The choice was informed by the belief that 
emissions trading is the lowest cost way of reducing emissions. It was also adopted as a 
climate change mitigation instrument in order to maintain New Zealand’s eco-friendly 
brand.446  
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This is not the first time New Zealand will be using emission trading for environmental 
purposes. Before now, New Zealand used a cap and trade program to move commercial 
fishing towards sustainable levels. Under the program, the government sets total 
allowable annual catch limits for each fish species in defined management areas, based 
on sustainable harvest considerations.447 The program began in 1986. The government 
created individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to approximately 2,500 commercial fishing 
permit-holders based on their historic catch levels. ITQs are permanent rights to harvest 
fish from a particular area. If the sum of the individual quotas exceeded the total 
allowable commercial catch (TACC) for a fish stock, the Government will make a one-
time purchase of the difference, and retire that portion of the quota. 
The ITQ system has led to heavy trading, as it is estimated that 77 percent of the initially 
allocated ITQs have changed hands. Under the program, the first receiver of the fish must 
attest to the fact that the fish products received are covered by ITQs. The Government 
investigates the paper records to detect inconsistencies. So, it is not surprising that New 
Zealand opted for emissions trading to mitigate climate change. 
New Zealand’s emissions profile resembles most of the countries in Africa because of its 
high dependence on agriculture. On average, emissions in developed countries and 
economies in transition are 83.2 percent CO2, 9.5 percent methane (CH4), and 5.9 percent 
nitrous oxide (N2O), but New Zealand’s emissions are 46.5 percent CO2, 35.2 percent 
CH4, and 17.2 percent N2O.448  
The program started in 2008 with only forest owners included.  The inclusion of forestry 
in the scheme is an attempt to address deforestation because, as part of its obligations 
under the Kyoto Protocol, New Zealand must account for emissions that occurred from 
deforestation.449 
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Under the scheme, all major owners of pre-1990 forests, or vested third parties, incur a 
deforestation liability for harvesting and not replanting.450  Owners of post-1989 forests 
can voluntarily opt in to participate in the scheme. They would receive NZUs for any 
increase in carbon stocks from 1 January 2008.451 However, they would face liability if 
carbon stock fell below a previously reported level.452 
The NZUs can be sold either at home or abroad. In 2009, public and private buyers 
purchased up to 600,000 forestry NZUs on the spot market.453 The Government of 
Norway purchased about 520,000 NZUs in 2009.454 
 In 2010, industrial processes, stationary energy sources, and liquid fossil fuel 
installations were included in the scheme. Beginning 1 January 2015, the program will 
cover nearly all emission sources of the New Zealand economy, and all greenhouse gases 
covered by the Kyoto Protocol.455 The program has no domestic cap; it operates within 
the global cap on emissions set by the Kyoto Protocol.456 The scheme has a price cap set 
at $25 per unit of CO2.  
For compliance, regulated entities have the choice of surrendering the free NZUs 
allocated to them if they are eligible, purchasing NZUs in the market or purchasing 
government-issued allowances at the fixed NZ$25 price. The government-issued NZUs 
are available in unlimited supply. They can only be surrendered; they cannot be banked 
or sold.457 Regulated entities have to surrender one NZU per two tonnes of CO2 
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emitted.458 This is known as the one-for-two obligation. The one-for-two obligation and 
price cap are intended to reduce some of the distributional effects of the program.459 
Certain international units can also be surrendered for compliance in unlimited quantities, 
such as CERs or ERUs. In 2011, scheme participants secured enough secondary CERs to 
achieve compliance for the next two to three years.460 
There are penalties for noncompliance. If a participant fails to surrender NZUs when it is 
meant to, or surrenders fewer NZUs than required, the units will be cancelled and the 
participant will pay a penalty of $30 for each NZU. A participant could be fined up to 
$24,000 if it knowingly fails to file its emission return.461 In addition, a participant that 
deliberately lies about its obligations could be fined up to $50,000, or be imprisoned for 5 
years.462 
Emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries (including agriculture) received free 
allowances on an intensity basis during the transition period of the program (2010- 
2012).463 
The intensity-based free allocation is meant to encourage efficiency improvements 
without penalizing increases in production or putting businesses at a competitive 
disadvantage in the international market.464 Free allowances were not granted to 
industries that are not trade-exposed, such as electricity generation and liquid fossil 
fuels.465 
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Some changes are being proposed to make the program more effective, including setting 
an absolute cap on covered emissions, limiting the use of international offset credits, 
maintaining the NZ$25 price ceiling beyond 2015, and allocating allowances through 
auction from 2014 or 2015.466 Agriculture participants (fertilizer suppliers and 
processors) have started reporting their emissions from January 2012 in preparation for 
the inclusion of agriculture in the scheme in 2015.467 They are to collect and retain data, 
and to use that data to calculate and annually report calendar year emissions. In the NZ 
ETS, emissions must generally be calculated by multiplying the quantity of a product by 
an “emissions factor”. The emissions factors used within the scheme represent the 
average tonnage of CO2-equivalent emissions of methane or nitrous oxide associated with 
one unit of the product, such as one tonne of meat produced.468 
Despite the NZU falling from NZ$13 per tonne of CO2 in late 2011 to NZ$0.19 in 
January 2013, the program appears to be a success.469 The New Zealand Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory and “net position” show that New Zealand is on track to meet its Kyoto 
obligations for the period 2008-2012.470 The report shows that New Zealand will have a 
surplus of 29.6 million emission units.471 The report is only a tentative assessment of the 
program, as it is still in its transitional phase. 
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5.6 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
African countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Zambia, Cameroon, Tanzania 
and Zimbabwe who have considerable emissions from the forestry sector)472 can use 
emissions trading to combat deforestation and enhance forest cover. New Zealand, a 
country that has commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to combat deforestation, has 
deployed emissions trading to halt the loss of forest cover and has achieved success, 
given the fact that the country is on course to meet its Kyoto commitment. African 
countries can follow the example set by New Zealand in this regard. 
Criminal sanctions for noncompliance, inherent in the New Zealand scheme, are a 
laudable provision that can be copied by African countries to ensure that erring 
participants do not sabotage the environmental goal of the program. 
5.7 Santiago Tradable Permit Program 
The Santiago Tradable Permit Program came into existence via the Supreme Decree 4 
(passed in 1992) and the Supreme Decree 16 (passed in 1997). Though the program was 
legislated as far back as 1992, it only became active in 1997.473 The program is meant to 
control total suspended particulate (TSP) emissions from the largest stationary sources 
(industrial boilers, industrial ovens, and large residential and commercial heaters 
discharging emissions from a duct or a stack at a flow rate higher than 1,000 m3/hour) in 
Santiago.474 The program was not designed on the basis of actual emissions, but on a 
proxy variable equal to the maximum emissions that a source could emit in a given 
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period of time; sources were too small to require a sophisticated monitoring procedure475 
The observable firm’s emission rate (mg/m3) is multiplied by its maximum possible 
output (m3/year) to infer its maximum emissions (mg/year) for which the firm must buy 
permits.476 
Sources operating by March 1992 were designated as existing sources and received 
grandfathered permits equal to the product of an emissions rate of 56 mg/m3 and their 
flow rate at the moment of registration. New sources receive no permits; they must cover 
their emissions by buying permits from existing sources.477 The total number of permits 
distributed was 64 percent of aggregate (proxied) emissions from existing sources prior to 
the program. After each annual inspection, the authority proceeds to reconcile the 
estimated emissions with the number of permits held by each source.478 
The program is credit based, in that all trades require approval by the regulatory agency, 
even trades among large boilers that share common ownership.479 A participant that 
wants to offset its emissions must request an offset and find a partner who is willing to 
sign an offsetting agreement. The offsetting agreement must specify the emissions to be 
compensated and the sources involved in the transaction. This is followed by certification 
of the emissions of the sources involved in the transaction through formal monitoring 
procedures. After all this procedure, the environmental agency accepts or rejects the 
transaction. In some other instances, it requests additional information.480 
There is no banking provision in the scheme; permits are given in perpetuity and large 
boilers are restricted to trading permits on a permanent basis. According to Montero et 
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al., this has created an illiquid market where sources are uncertain about the availability 
of permits in the future, and where buyers pay prices close to their top prices.481 
Like most ETS, the program relies on self-reporting by regulated entities. Existing and 
new boilers report emissions once a year to the authorities.482 As part of the reporting 
requirements of the program, sources must contact an independent and certified 
laboratory to monitor the flow and the concentration of emissions discharged through 
their stacks.483 Sources that fail to meet the reporting requirement face sanctions ranging 
from $4.50 to $90,000. 
According to Montero, the program proved to be more cost effective than traditional 
regulation.484 Coria and Sterner’s evaluation of the program showed that the program has 
been met with aggregate over-compliance, but this was massively aided by the switch to 
natural gas.485 See Appendix E. 
The authors’ review shows that the program’s development has been hampered by high 
transaction costs due to the credit nature of the program and the lengthy time it takes to 
reconcile permits.486 The program suffers from design issues, one of its limiting factors 
being the lack of public participation.487 
All in all, the Santiago program shows that emission trading can achieve some measure 
of success in a developing country. The program has successfully achieved emissions 
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reduction. Chile now has a complete inventory of pollution sources in Santiago. Trading 
activity has also increased over time.488 The program has been cost effective thus far. 
5.8 Lessons and Transferable Ideas from the Santiago 
Tradable Permit Program 
Africa can use emissions trading (though not the credit based model adopted by Chile, 
because of its high transaction costs) to combat air pollution. It is now clear that climate 
change and air pollution are closely coupled. According to a report by the US EPA,489 
ozone is a significant contributor to climate warming. The climate impacts of ozone are 
greatest when it is located in the upper part of the troposphere. Particle pollution can also 
have significant effects on the climate because of its ability to absorb and scatter light.490 
In addition to greenhouse gases already in the scheme, including regular pollutants such 
as Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), CFCs, and HFCs, will be good for the climate. 
African countries can use emissions trading to achieve a complete inventory of 
greenhouse gases, just like Chile used it to achieve a complete inventory. Having this 
inventory will aid in the formulation of other climate change mitigation policies. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated how African countries can contribute to UNFCCC’s goal to 
stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Cooperation is 
necessary between developed countries and developing countries if the goal of the 
UNFCCC is to be realised.  Two research questions were formulated for this study: 
“What are the gaps in Africa’s climate change mitigation policy architecture?” and, 
“Would adopting an emissions trading scheme as a policy instrument close the identified 
gaps?” 
In resolving the first question, reference was made to the proposed carbon tax in South 
Africa, the REDD+ initiative, the CDM implementation in Africa, and the NAMA 
initiative. 
This thesis concludes that, going forward, the existing mitigation initiatives are 
inadequate and will not allow African countries contribute effectively to the goal of the 
Convention. 
This thesis also highlights the ways in which a domestic emissions trading scheme can 
assist. A cap on emissions can achieve more than the current piecemeal approach under 
the CDM.  A cap on the downstream sector, for instance, will not only reduce emissions 
from the sector, but also reduce transport emissions, because low quality fuels produced 
from the refineries are one of the causes of increased transport emissions. What is more, 
the emissions of the continent are expected to grow in the future as countries undergo 
development. 
The drivers of deforestation in Africa threaten to undermine the new mitigation initiative 
(REDD+) for developing countries. It has been shown that the drivers of deforestation are 
economic, which makes the incentive-based system, inherent in a tradable permit scheme, 
an appropriate remedy. A tradable permit scheme involving farmers and other forest-
dependent communities will put a value on forest cover and thus halt the loss of such.  
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The success of REDD+ implementation will ensure that Africa contributes its fair quota 
of diminishing the rising concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It has 
been argued that emissions trading could be a source of revenue for African countries, 
which can be used to implement other mitigation measures. Revenues generated from 
auctioning allowances can be used to finance renewable energy development. 
For this to happen, auctioning has to be part of the design of the scheme. However, 
auctioning has distributional implications. For instance, auctioning off allowances to 
companies in the power sector could lead to increased electricity tariffs, as power 
companies will want to shift the burden to the consumers. If the revenue generated from 
auctioning is invested in generating electricity from renewable sources, this will address 
the energy deficit in Africa. More people will have access to electricity.  If the revenue 
realised from auctioning is adequately invested in energy generation, consumers will 
have the option of choosing between clean and unclean energy sources. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the policy is already under consideration in South Africa. 
If the government of South Africa goes ahead with the introduction of the policy, the 
program will mostly likely cover its energy generation sector, as it accounts for the bulk 
of its emissions. The design of the program should have a price ceiling and floor.491 This 
will address price crashes due to outside factors such as economic crises, which 
determine the supply and demand for allowances. The price ceiling is normally set at a 
rate considered to be harmful for economic productivity, while the floor is set at a rate 
where it would become impossible for companies to stop reducing emissions effectively. 
If the price gets too high, more allowances will be supplied to keep the price down. If the 
price gets too low, some allowances will have to be withdrawn. This is why it is very 
important that allowances are not made to be property rights. If they are property rights, 
they inure to the benefits of the holders until disposed of. This will prevent a litigation 
backlash due to the withdrawal of allowances. 
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Over-allocation of allowances should be avoided. Over-allocation can also lead to a price 
crash. Allocating 50 percent of the allowances for free, and the remainder through 
auctioning, from the inception of the program can help avoid an oversupply of 
allowances as well. 
South Africa can decide to implement the scheme alone, or partner with other high 
emitting countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Nigeria to form a regional scheme. The larger 
the sources, the more cost effective the scheme will be. 
A lot of capacity building needs to be done before the policy can thrive in Africa. Any 
country in Africa that wants to implement a tradable permit scheme could partner with 
the European Union in setting up—and preventing cyber-attacks on—the registry. What 
is more, the climate change secretariat will be more than willing to assist in capacity 
building if the policy makers in Africa see its merit. Linking the registry of the scheme to 
the international registry established under the Kyoto Protocol will ensure that 
transactions under the scheme are transparent and that the scheme meets UNFCCC’s 
overall objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere. In 
conclusion, emissions trading is a viable policy option for fighting climate change in 
Africa.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Sectors and Source Categories for CDM Project Activities.  
Greenhouse gas emission reductions 
Energy Industrial processes Agriculture Waste 
CO2 – CH4 – N2O 
CO2– N2O – HFCs – 
PFCs – SF6 CH4 – N2O CH4 
Fuel combustion 
Energy industries· 
Manufacturing 
industries 
Construction 
Transport 
• Other sectors 
Fugitive emissions  
from fuels 
Solid fuels 
Oil and natural gas 
 
Mineral products· 
Chemical industry  
Metal production 
Production and 
consumption of 
halocarbons and 
sulphur hexafluoride  
Solvent use 
Others  
 
Enteric fermentation 
• Rice cultivation  
Agricultural soils  
Prescribed burning of  
savannas (cerrado) 
Filed burning of 
agricultural residues  
• Others 
 
Solid waste disposal  
Wastewater handling 
Waste incineration· 
Others 
 
CO2 removals 
Reforestation/afforestation 
Source: Nederberger, Anne and Raymond Saner, “Exploring the relationship between FDI flows and CDM 
potential” (2005) 14 Transnational Corporations 1. 
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Appendix B: Types and Numbers of CDM Projects in Africa 
Types of CDM projects in Africa Number of 
projects 
Landfill gas 29 
Wind 27 
Biomass energy 27 
Reforestation 17 
Hydro 16 
Fossil fuel switch 11 
EE households  10 
N2O 8 
EE own generation 8 
Fugitive  8 
Methane avoidance 7 
Solar 7 
Afforestation 4 
Cement 3 
EE industry 3 
EE supply side 2 
Geothermal 2 
Coal bed/mine methane 1 
Source: Carbon Markets and Africa: a Quick Factsheet for Journalists, online: 
<http://www.unep.org/climatechange/Portals/5/cop17/docs/Carbon_Markets_and_Afria_Resource_Guide_f
or_Journalists.pdf>. 
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Appendix C: Most Populous Countries and Total Fertility Rates, 2012 
2012 2050 
Country Population (Millions) Country Population (Millions) 
China 1350 India 1691 
India 1260 China 1211 
United States 314 United States 423 
Indonesia 241 Nigeria 402 
Brazil 194 Pakistan 314 
Pakistan 180 Indonesia 309 
Nigeria 170 Bangladesh 226 
Bangladesh 153 Brazil 213 
Russia 142 Dem. Rep. Congo 194 
Japan 128 Ethiopia 166 
Countries with the Highest Total Fertility Rates 2012 
Country TFR 
Niger 7.1 
Somalia 6.4 
Burundi 6.4 
Mali 6.3 
Angola 6.3 
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Dem. Rep. Congo 6.3 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, online: <http://www.prb.org/pdf12/2012-population-data-
sheet_eng.pdf>. 
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Appendix D: Facilities Used for Mining/Drilling, Processing, and Refining of 
Petroleum in Africa 
Country Location/Name Owner/Operator 
Angola Lobito Sociedade Nacional de PetrÃ³leos de Angola (Sonangol) 
Angola Luanda Sociedade Nacional de PetrÃ³leos de Angola (Sonangol) 
Benin SÃ¨mÃ¨ Kpodji Zetah Oil Company of CÃ´te d’Ivoire (private, 100 percent) 
Cameroon 
About 21 oilfields, which 
included Bavo, Ekoundou 
Horst, Eloundou,Eloundou 
Nord Marine, Ekoundou 
Sud, Itindi, and Kombo 
Centre 
Total Exploration and Production Cameroun (Total S.A., 100 
percent) 
Cameroon 
Makoko Northeast, 
Makoko-Anana and makoko 
South Marine Fields; 
Lipenja 
Pecten Cameroon Co.  (Pecten International, 80 percent) 
Cameroon Moudi and Kribi Fields Pecten Cameroon Co. 
Cameroon Refinery at Limbe Societa Nationale de Raffinage  (Government, 66 percent) 
Chad 
Bolobo, Kome, and 
Miandoum Fields 
Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. (Exxon Mobil 
Corp.,40 percent)  
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
East Mibale and 5 other 
offshore wells 
Societe de Recherche et d’Exploitation des petroles au 
Congo, Perenco plc  (France and Uunited Kingdom) 
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Muanda 
Societe Congo-Italienne de Raffinage (SOCIR), 
(Government, 50 percent, Agip SA, 50 percent) 
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Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Offshore Wells (y) 
ChevronTexaco Oil Congo (DRC) Ltd. [Muanda International 
Oil Co. (Perenco plc (Europe) 50 percent )] 
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Onshore wells TotalFinaElf 
Cote D’Ivoire Abidjan SociÃ©tÃ© Ivorienne de Raffinage 
Egypt Ain al-Sokhna to Sidi Kir Arab Petroleum Pipeline Co. (Egypt, 50 percent) 
Egypt Alexandria Alexandria Petroleum Co. (Government, 100 percent) 
Egypt Ameriya 
Ameriya Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100 
percent)      
Egypt Asyut Asyut Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100 percent) 
Egypt Belayim, Suez Gulf 
Belayim Petroleum Co. (EGPC, 50 percent; International 
Egyptian Oil Co. 50 percent) 
Egypt Gulf Of Suez, October Gulf of Suez Oil Co. (EGPC , 50 percent; Amoco, 50 percent) 
Egypt Gulf of Suez, Ras Budran Suez Oil Company (EGPC, 50 percent) 
Egypt Mostorod, Tanta Cairo Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100 percent) 
Egypt Suez El-Nasr Petroleum Refining Co. (Government, 100 percent) 
Egypt Suez Suez Petroleum Processing  Co. (Government, 100 percent) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Alba Field, Alba Block Joint Venture of Marathon Oil Co.( 63 percent) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Ceiba Field, Block G Triton Equatorial Guinea, Inc.(80.75 percent) 
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Equatorial 
Guinea 
Punta Europa Marathon Oil Co.(52 percent) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Zafiro Field, Block B Joint Venture of Mobil Equatorial Guinea Inc.(71.25 percent) 
Eritrea Assab Petroleum Corp. of Eritrea 
Gabon 15 km South of Mayumba Perenco Plc. 
Gabon 
60 km Southwest of Port 
Gentil 
Perenco plc. 
Gabon Anguille field Total Group, 100 percent 
Gabon Atora field Total Group, 40 percent (Total is the operator.) 
Gabon Avocette field Total Group, 57.5 percent (Total is the operator) 
Gabon 
Avocette, Coucal, and Hylia 
fields 
Elf Gabon 
Gabon Baudroie Nord field Total Group, 50 percent (Total is the operator) 
Gabon 
Gamba-Ivinga Field, 
Onshore Gamba 
Shell Gabon 
Gabon Gonelle Field Total Group, 100 percent 
Gabon 
Oguendjo Offshore Field, 85 
km Southeast of Port Gentil 
Perenco Plc. 
Gabon Port Gentil  SociÃ©tÃ© Gabonaise de Raffinage 
Gabon 
Rabi-Kounga Field, 100 km 
North of Gamba 
Total Group, 47.5 percent (Total is the operator.) 
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Ghana Saltpond and Tano Fields Ghana National Petroleum Corp. (Government, 100 percent) 
Ghana Tema Tema Oil Refinery (Government, 100 percent) 
Kenya Mombasa Kenya Petroleum Refineries Ltd. [Government, 50 percent;  
Libya Az Zawiya Az Zawiya Oil Refining Co. 
Libya Marsa el Brega  Libyan National Oil Co. 
Libya Ras Lanuf Ras Lanuf Oil and gas Processing Co. 
Libya Sarir Arabian Gulf Oil Co. 
Libya Tobruk Arabian Gulf Oil Co. 
Madagascar Toamasina Galana International, Groupe Trimeta, Gulf  
Mauritania Nouadhibou refinery SociÃ©tÃ© Mauritanienne d'Industrie de Raffinage 
Morocco Bouhoua, Nador  
SociÃ©tÃ© d'Exploitation des Mines du Rif  (SEFERIF) 
(BRPM, 100 percent) 
Morocco Mohammedia 
SociÃ©tÃ© Anonyme Marocaine de l'Industrie du Raffinage 
(SAMIR) (Group Corral Petroleum, 64.7 percent) 
Morocco Sidi Kacem SAMIR 
Nigeria Kaduna refinery Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemicals Co. Ltd. 
Nigeria New Port Harcourt  - 
Nigeria Niger Delta  
Various joint ventures with Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corp. 
Nigeria Old Port Harcourt  - 
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Nigeria Warri Refinery Warri Refinery and Petrochemicals Co. Ltd. 
Senegal Dakar SociÃ©tÃ© Africaine de Raffinage (private, 100 percent) 
Sierra Leone Freetown Sierra Leone Petroleum Refining Co. Ltd. 
Somalia Mogadishu Iraqsoma Refinery Co. 
South Africa Cape Town Caltex Oil SA Pty. Ltd. (private, 100 percent) 
South Africa Gencor, Durban Engen Ltd. (62 percent) 
South Africa Johannesburg area Africa Pty. Ltd. (Sasol Ltd., Total SA) 
South Africa Mossel Bay 
Mossgas (Pty) Ltd. (Government, 100 percent through 
Central Energy Fund) 
South Africa Natref, Secunda National Petroleum Refiners of South 
South Africa Oribi field area, Mossel Bay 
Southern Oil Exploration Co. (Soeker)(Government, 100 
percent) 
South Africa Oryx field  
Southern Oil Exploration Co. (Soeker)(Government, 100 
percent) 
South Africa Sanref, Durban 
Shell and BP Refineries Pty. Ltd. (Shell International B.V., 50 
percent; BP Plc, 50 percent) 
Sudan Abu Jabra Government 
Sudan 
Block 1, Unity, El Toor, 
Tooma South Fields; Block 
1a, Munga, Khairat Fields; 
Block 2, Grand Heglig Field  
(Heglig, Barki, Hamra, 
Kanga Laloba, Rihan, and 
Toma  Fields); Block 2a, 
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co. [China National 
Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), 40 percent] 
151 
 
Bamboo, Garaad Fields 
Sudan Block 3 – Adar-Yale Field 
Petrodar Consortium (China National Petroleum Corp. 41 
percent)  
Sudan Block 6 – Abu Gabra China National Petroleum Corp. 
Sudan El Obeid Government 
Sudan Jali 
Khartoum Oil Refinery (China National Petroleum Corp.,  50 
percent; Sudan Petroleum Corp., 50 percent) 
Sudan Port Sudan Port Sudan Refining Ltd. (Government, 100 percent) 
Sudan Shajirah Concorp Ltd. 
Tanzania Dar es Salaam Tanzanian & Italian Petroleum Refining Co. 
Tunisia Bizerte Societe Tunisienne des Industries du Raffinage  
Source:  Petroleum Facilities in Africa (6 June 2010), online: Afribiz 
<http://www.afribiz.info/content/petroleum-facilities-in-africa>. 
Cement Facilities in Africa 
Country Location/Name Owner/Operator 
Algeria Aïn Touta 
Société des Ciments d’Aïn-Touta (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives 
de l’Est, 100 percent) 
Algeria Aïn-Kébira  
Société des Ciments d’Aïn-Kébira (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives 
de l’Est, 100 percent) 
Algeria Bekkouche  
Société des Ciments de Tébessa (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives de 
l’Est, 100 percent) 
Algeria Beni-Saf Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés de l’Ouest 
Algeria Chlef Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés d’Ech  
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Algeria Hamma-Bouziane 
Société des Ciments de Hamma-Bouziane (Enterprise des Ciments et 
Derives de l’Est, 100 percent) 
Algeria Meftah Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés du Centre 
Algeria M’Sila 
Algerian Cement Co. (Orascom ConstructionIndustries S.A., 100 
percent)1 
Algeria Raïs-Hamidou Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés du Centre 
Algeria Saïda Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés de l’Ouest 
Algeria Sour-El-Ghoziane Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés du Centre 
Algeria Tébessa 
Société des Ciments de Tébessa (Enterprise des Ciments et Derives de 
l’Est, 100 percent) 
Algeria Zahana Entreprise des Ciments et Dérivés de l’Ouest 
Angola Luanda 
Nova Cimangola S.A.R.L.(Scanang Holding Co., 49 percent, 
Government, 39.8 percent, and Bank BAI, 9.5 percent) 
Benin Cotonou Plant Ciments du Benin S.A. (Lafarge Group significant minority holder) 
Benin Do. 
Société des Ciments du Benin (Government, 50 percent, and  private, 
50 percent) 
Benin Onigbolo plant Société des Ciments d’Onigbolo (Amida Group, 100 percent) 
Burkina Faso Ouagadougou plant Ciment du Burkina (Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland, 100 percent) 
Burundi Bujumbura Burundi Cement Plant 
Cameroon 
Bonaberi near 
Douala and Figuil at 
Garoua 
Cimentaries du Cameroun (Lafarge Group, 57 percent) 
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Congo – 
Brazzaville 
Loutété Nouvelle Société de Ciments du Congo 
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Kabimba in 
theLubumbashi area, 
Katanga Province 
Interlacs (The Forrest Group) 
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Kimpese  Cimenterie Nationale SARL 
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Lubudi , in the Likasi 
and Kolwezi area, 
Katanga Province 
Cemenkat, (The Forrest Group, and Gecamines) 
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Luena  La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines). 
Congo – 
Kinshasa 
Lukala in the 
Kinshasa area in Bas-
Congo Province 
Lukala Cements Company, (The Forrest Group) 
Cote D’Ivoire Abidjan Plant Société des Ciments d’Abidjan (Government, 40 percent) 
Cote D’Ivoire Abidjan Plant 
Société Ivorienne de Ciment et Materiaux (Holcim and Origny, 80 
percent) 
Cote D’Ivoire San Pedro 
Société des Ciments du Sud-Ouest (Government and Omnium 
Tropical) 
Egypt Ain Sukhna Suez Cement Co. 
Egypt Ameriyah Ameriyah Cement Co. 
Egypt Assiut Asiut Cement Co. 
Egypt Beni Suef National Cement Co. 
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Egypt El Mex Alexandria Portland Cement Co. 
Egypt El Minya Helwan Portland Cement Co. 
Egypt El Tabbin National Cement Co. 
Egypt Helwan Helwan Portland Cement Co. 
Egypt NA Egyptian Cement Co. (Orascom Group, 40 percent; private 
Eritrea Massawa Eritrea Cement Works 
Ethiopia Addis Ababa Mugher Cement Enterprise (Government- 
Ethiopia Dire Dawa Mugher Cement Enterprise (Government- 
Ethiopia Mekele Messebo Building Materials Production  
Ethiopia Mugher Mugher Cement Enterprise (Government- 
Gabon Franceville Ciments du Gabon  
Gabon Owendo Ciments du Gabon  
Ghana Takoradi Ghana Cement Works Ltd. (Heidelberg Zement AG of Germany) 
Ghana Tema Ghana Cement Works Ltd. (Heidelberg Zement AG of Germany) 
Guinea Conakry Ciments de Guinee 
Kenya Athi River East African Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
Kenya Kaloleni Athi River Mining Ltd. 
Kenya Mombasa Bamburi Cement Ltd. 
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Kenya Nairobi Bamburi Cement Ltd. 
Liberia Monrovia  Liberia Cement Corp 
Libya Al Margab (Homs 1) Arab Cement Co. 
Libya 
El Hawari, Benghazi 
Province 
Libyan Cement Co. 
Libya Fataih, Derna Libyan Cement Co. 
Libya Libda (Homs 2) Arab Cement Co. 
Libya 
Souk el Khamis, 
Tripoli 
Arab Cement Co. 
Libya Zliten Arab Cement Co. 
Madagascar Ibity Holcim Madagascar S.A.  
Madagascar Mahajanga SA Nouvelle Cimenterie Amboanio  
Malawi Blantyre Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
Malawi Changalume Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
Malawi Livwezi Shayona Cement Corp. 
Mali Bamako Société Lou Kouma (private, 100 percent) 
Mali Bamako area Diamou Cement (private, 100 percent) 
Mauritania 
Nouakchott grinding 
plant 
Ciment de Mauritanie (private, 100 percent) 
Morocco  Agadir Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)  
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Morocco Cadem, at Meknes Asment de Temara 
Morocco 
Douar Laaouameur, 
south of Casablanca  
Société Lafarge Ciments S.A. (Lafarge Maroc, 69.2 percent) 
Morocco Fès, at Doukkarat  Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A 
Morocco Fès, at Ras El Ma  Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A 
Morocco 
Kiln and mill at 
Oujda 
Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A. (Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland, 51 percent) 
Morocco Layoune  Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)  
Morocco Marrakech Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)  
Morocco Nador  Société Holcim (Maroc) S.A 
Morocco Safi Société les Ciments du Maroc S.A. (CIMAR)  
Morocco Tamuda, at Tétouan Asment de Temara 
Morocco Tangier Asment de Temara 
Morocco Temara Asment de Temara (Cimentos de Portugal, 57.4 percent) 
Morocco Tétouan II  Asment de Temara 
Mozambique Dondo  Cimentos de Mocambique, SARL 
Mozambique Matola Cimentos de Mocambique, SARL 
Mozambique Nacala Cimentos de Mocambique, SARL 
Niger Malbaza plant Société Nigeriénne de Cimenterie (Holderbank, 77 percent) 
157 
 
Nigeria Ashanka Ashanka Cement Co. plc 
Nigeria Benue State Benue Cement Co. p.l.c. 
Nigeria Calbar United Cement Co of Nigieria 
Nigeria Ewekoro West Africa Portland Cement Co. 
Nigeria Ibese Dangote Cement Works 
Nigeria Nkalagu Nigeria Cement Co. 
Nigeria Okepella Bendel Cement Co. Ltd. 
Nigeria Shagamu West Africa Portland Cement Co. 
Nigeria Sokoto Cement Co. of Northern Nigeria 
Reunion Bourbon Ciments de Bourbon SA 
Rwanda Plant at Cyangugu Cimenterie du Rwanda  
Senegal Kirène  Les Ciments du Sahek S.A. of Senegal (private, 100 percent) 
Senegal Rufisque  Société Ouest Africaine des Ciments (private, 100 percent) 
Sierra Leone Freetown  Sierra Leone Cement Corp. Ltd. (HeidlebergCement, 50 percent) 
Somalia Berbera  Berbera Cement Agency 
South Africa 
De Hoek, 
Dwaalboom, 
Herculese, Jupiter, 
Slurru, Riebeeck 
West, Port Elizabeth 
Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd. (Barlworld Trust Co. Ltd., 60.3 
percent) 
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South Africa 
Dudfield, 
Lichtenburg area, 
Roodepoort 
 Alpha Ltd. [Holcim Ltd. (Switzerland)] 
South Africa Durban area  Lafarge South Africa Ltd. [Lafarge (France)] 
South Africa 
Lichtenburg, North 
West Province 
 Lafarge South Africa Ltd. [Lafarge (France)] 
South Africa 
Simumu plant, 125 
kilometers southwest 
of Durban; also 
grinding mills at 
Durban and 
Newcastle 
Natal Portland Cement Co. (Pty.) Ltd. [Cimentos de Portugal SGPS, 
S.A. (CIMPOR)] 
South Africa Ulco   Alpha Ltd. [Holcim Ltd. (Switzerland)] 
Sudan Atbara 
Atbara Cement Company Ltd. (LaFarge Group of France and Dal 
Group of Sudan) 
Sudan Rabak Nile Cement Company (Government, 100 percent) 
Tanzania Mbeya Mbeya Cement Co. Ltd. (LaFarge Group) 
Tanzania Tanga Tanga Cement Co. Ltd. (Holcim Ltd., 60 percent) 
Tanzania Wazo Hill Tanzania Portland Cement Co. Ltd.  
Togo Lomé Ciments du Togo S.A. 
Togo Tabligbo West African Cement S.A. 
Tunisia Ben Arous Société de Ciments Artificiels Tunisiens 
Tunisia Bizerte Société de Ciment de Bizerte 
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Tunisia Enfida Société de Ciment d’Enfida 
Tunisia Feriana Société Tuniso-Algérienne de Ciment Blanc S.A. 
Tunisia Gabès Société de Ciment de Gabès 
Tunisia Jbel Oust Société de Ciment de Jbel Oust 
Tunisia Le Kef Société de Ciment d’Oum el Kélil   
Uganda Kasese Hima Cement Industries Ltd. (Bamburi Cement Ltd., 70 percent) 
Uganda Tororo Tororo Cement Industries Ltd. 
Zambia Lusaka Chilanga Cement plc (Lafarge, 51 percent) 
Zambia Ndola  Chilanga Cement plc (Lafarge, 51 percent) 
Zimbabwe Bulawayo Portland Holdings Ltd. (Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd.) 
Zimbabwe Gwanda Portland Holdings Ltd. (Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd.) 
Zimbabwe Harare Circle Cement (Pvt. ) Ltd. 
Zimbabwe Indiva Sino-Zimbabwe Cement 
Source: Cement Operations in Africa (1 June 2010), online: Afribiz 
<http://www.afribiz.info/content/cement-operations-in-africa>. 
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Appendix E: Compliance in the Santiago Tradable Permit Program 
 
Source: Coria and Sterner, Tradable Permits in Developing Countries Evidence From Air Pollution in 
Santiago, Chile, (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper December 2008), 1 at 27, online: 
<http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-08-51.pdf>. 
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